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Abstract
The Strategic Implications of the Current Internet Design for Cyber Security
by
Charles M. Iheagwara
Submitted to the System Design and Management Program in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Engineering and Management
In the last two decades, the Internet system has evolved from a collection point of a few
networks to a worldwide interconnection of millions of networks and users who connect
to transact virtually all kinds of business. The evolved network system is also known as
Cyberspace.
The use of Cyberspace is now greatly expanded to all fields of human endeavor by far
exceeding the original design projection. And even though, the Internet architecture and
design has been robust enough to accommodate the extended domains of uses and
applications, it has also become a medium used to launch all sorts of Cyber attacks that
results into several undesirable consequences to users.
This thesis analyzes the current Internet system architecture and design and how their
flaws are exploited to launch Cyber attacks; evaluates reports from Internet traffic
monitoring activities and research reports from several organizations; provides a mapping
of Cyber attacks to Internet architecture and design flaw origin; conducts Internet system
stakeholder analysis; derives strategic implications of the impact of Internet system
weaknesses on Cyber security; and makes recommendations on the broader issues of
developing effective strategies to implement Cyber security in enterprise systems that
have increasingly become complex.
From a global architectural design perspective, the study conducted demonstrates that
although the Internet is a robust design, the lack of any means of authentication on the
system is primarily responsible for the host of Cyber security issues and thus has become
the bane of the system.
Following the analysis, extrapolation of facts and by inferences we conclude that the
myriad of Cyber security problems will remain and continue on the current exponential
growth path until the Internet and in particular the TCP/IP stack is given the ability to
authenticate and that only through a collaborative effort by all stakeholders of the Internet
system can the other major Cyber security issues be resolved especially as it relates to
envisioning and fashioning new Cyber security centric technologies.
Thesis Supervisor: James M. Utterback.
Title: David J. McGrath jr (1959) Professor of Management and Innovation and
Professor of Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the last two decades, the Internet system has evolved from a collection point of a few
networks to a worldwide interconnection of millions of networks and users who connect
to transact virtually all kinds of business. Today, this evolved network system is also
known as Cyberspace.
The use of Cyberspace is now greatly expanded to many areas by far exceeding the intent
of use(s) of the original design and has increasingly been extended to all fields of human
endeavor. Although, the Internet architecture and design has been robust enough to
accommodate the extended uses and applications, it has also become a medium used to
launch all sorts of Cyber attacks that results into several undesirable consequences to
users.
What is interesting is that the scope and scale of the attacks continue to increase day by
day even as new counter measures are adopted, new attack types emerge making this a
wide open theater with many actors like Cyber criminals on the one hand wrecking havoc
on the system and Information Technology (IT) security professionals, researchers, and
others on the other hand cleaning up and addressing the issues created by Cyber
criminals-
Hence, the motivation for this study is to look at the different dynamics at play and
discern some facts from where we analyze which of the Internet design elements and
factors gives rise to or contributes to Cyber attacks and then derive strategic implications
arising from them.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this study is to analyze the current Internet system design with respect to
the flaws inherent in the architecture and how these give rise to Cyber attacks.
Additional objectives are to conduct a stakeholder analysis to establish implied mandates
for Cyber security responsibilities; and to discern strategic implications arising from
unfulfilled stakeholder design goals and intents of the Internet system.
1.3 Approach to Research
We will follow the following logical approach for this study:
1. First, we will review and describe the Internet evolution, architecture and design;
and Cyber space from different literature sources
2. Second, we will analyze the flaws inherent in the current architecture that serves
as the conduit for Cyber attackss
3. Next, we will design a grid that maps each known Cyber attack to the Internet
architecture
4. Following this, we will conduct a stakeholder analysis to discern expressed
mandates in the design and roles and responsibilities associated with maintaining
security on the Internet system
5. Then, we will derive the strategic implications of the design flaws - both
intentional and unintentional - for Cyber security
6. Finally, we will conclude and make recommendations on how to improve the
Internet design for Cyber security
Exhibit I is a graphical representation of the approach.
1 1
5. Dderivation of the strategic
implications of the current Internet system
design for Cyber security
6. Conclusion and recommendations
3. Mapping of Cyber
attacks to the origination point -o 4. Stakeholder analysis
on the Internet architecture
Exhibit 1: Thesis Research Approach
1.4 Summary of Work
The Internet design manifests a robust architecture that is elastic enough to integrate new
processes, applications and technologies. This is at the very essence of the layering and
stratification of the design which segregates stack functions at each layer and aims to
simplify, satisfy the various demands and drive efficiency of the process. Stallings (2006)
has provided a vivid description of the layering structure of the TCP/IP Internet model.
For example, on the IP layer Stalling asserts: "this layered modularity gave rise to the
"hourglass" metaphor for the Internet architecture the creation of a multi-layer suite of
protocols, with a generic packet (datagram) delivery mechanism as a separate layer at the
hourglass' waist. This abstract bit-level network service at the hourglass' waist is provided
by IP and ensures the critical separation between an ever more versatile physical network
infrastructure below the waist and an ever-increasing user demand for higher-level
services and applications above the waist."
1. literature review and
foundation studies on the
Internet evolution, architecture
and design and Cyberspace
2. Analysis of the flaws of
the Internet system
architecture and design
The resulting Internet design is one that has lived up to expectation of its robust and
durable architecture, but, which nevertheless, lacks the mechanism to authenticate and
provide a security platform. It is the lack of this together with the flaws of the TCP/IP
protocol stack and other communication protocols that accounts for most of the Cyber
attacks recorded today.
In this thesis, we analyze the current Internet design, Cyberspace and security, the flaws
in the current architecture and stakeholder analysis of the Internet system.
Then, we review and analyze several research and monitoring reports, interpret the
statistical data reported on Cyber attacks and develop a scheme that maps each attack
type to specific Internet architecture layer.
Finally, we drive implications arising therefore for Cyber security.
The following summarizes the work completed and presented in this Thesis.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 provides background information related to the Internet, and its use as a
medium to conduct online transactions. To understand the nature of the medium, we
conducted a literature review of Cyberspace. The results of our review shows that Cyber
space is not sufficiently secure as several security breaches have occurred over it, and
that it has also become a breeding ground for Cyber criminals.
In response to this, organizations now implement security measures on their information
systems under the umbrella of Cyber security practice groups organized as new business
units.
Further, in this Chapter we have studied the progressive evolution of Cyber security
practices over the years and note that Cyber security as it is practiced today represents
different standards and norms, each of which is interpreted and implemented to the extent
permissible by organizational resources and constraints and that although not yet
sufficient to combat current and future security issues, significant progress has been made
at least by establishing the frameworks to implement security in Cyberspace. The "Bolts"
and "Nuts' that have evolved over the years are discussed in their shapes and forms under
the" Current State of Practice" in Section 2.5.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 presents a description of the architecture and design of the TCP/IP protocol
suite that serves as the primary transport and communication mechanism in Cyberspace.
The five-layer TCP/IP protocol suite consists (from the bottom up) of the physical, link,
internetwork, transport, and application layers.
In addition, we analyzed the flaws inherent in the Internet architecture and design flaws
and note that the TCP/IP vulnerabilities are exploited by the threat agents given Table 2
to launch the Cyber attacks present in Appendix I.
Also, the Domain Name System is discussed in the context of its architecture and
weaknesses that also serves as a conduit for Cyber attacks.
We note in conclusion:
1. Robustness: The Internet design manifests a robust architecture that is elastic
enough to integrate new processes, applications and technologies.
2. Efficiency: The layered architecture is intended to provide efficiency through
roles assignment.
3. Platform Independence and IP Layer: The Internet Protocol (IP) is the
internetworking protocol for TCP/IP, and its main task is to adequately implement
all the mechanisms necessary to knit together divergent networking technologies
and administrative domains into a single virtual network (an "internet") so as to
enable data communication between sending and receiving hosts, irrespective of
where in the network they are.
4. TCP Layer: The layer above IP is the transport (TC) layer, where the most
commonly used Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) deals, among other issues,
with end-to-end congestion control and assures that arbitrarily large streams of
data are reliably delivered and arrive at their destination in the order sent.
5. Application Layer: Also, the top layer in the TCP/IP protocol suite is the
application layer, which contains a range of protocols that directly serve the user;
e.g., telnet (for remote login), ftp (the File Transfer Protocol for transferring files,
smtp (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol for e-mail), http (the HyperText Transfer
Protocol for the World Wide Web).
Chapter 4
One of the key objectives of this Chapter is to match several well-known Cyber attack
types to the Internet layer that serves as the conduit for such attacks and then quantify
each attack type as a percentage of the overall Cyber attack types.
To accomplish this, we reviewed and analyzed several Internet traffic monitoring reports
and statistical research studies on Cyber attacks, and deduced several facts to aid our
interpretation of the domain knowledge.
Following the review and analysis and by inferences from research results and the data
presented in the previous Chapters, we developed a grid that maps each Cyber attack type
to specific Internet architecture layers and discerned several well-known trends in the
constantly evolving Cyber attacks.
Finally, we conclude that quantification is difficult to realize because of insufficient and
scanty data from which such quantification could be derived; and the lack of any known
predictive (or adaptive) model that can help us to accomplish this.
Chapter 5
The Internet is an engineering system with different sub-systems that fuses together as a
single whole. Over the years since its original design, it has become increasingly complex
with the addition of millions of networks with different architectural make-ups and
requirements. In effect, the Internet has become a massive infrastructure powered by
different applications, technologies and linked networks.
Given the above, in Chapter 5, we have conducted a stakeholder-beneficiary analysis of
the Internet system to among others discern stakeholder intent and goals evident in the
original design and the security requirements mandated for the system.
Based on our analysis, we note that there is an expressed mandate in the original intent
and goal for the architecture of the process to include security - even though the design
element leaves this out. We delineated the different value related processes and
instruments used to execute processes. Interestingly, the value related instruments such as
routers, switches and other routing devices have become part of the internet massive
infrastructure outlay and without adequate security have also become a bane of the
process.
Finally, we conclude that stakeholders have the primary responsibility of assuring
security on the system in a collaborative fashion.
Chapter 6
Based on the facts and inferences from our analysis, we discern several implications for
Cyber security arising from the current Internet architecture vulnerabilities.
Primary among them are the implications for a potential Cyber warfare on nations and
transnational infrastructures; constantly emerging threat and attack types that extends the
security domain and perimeter of the enterprise, the emergence of a new underground
economy where Cyber war lords rule over Cyberspace and aided with low entry barriers
and technology can at will wreck havoc on any intended target.
These and the other implications we predict are gradually building up to what may
potentially become a useful arsenal for rogue nations for Cyber warfare.
Finally, we conclude that the primary constraint here is the lack of any authentication
mechanism on the Internet system around which an effective preventive defense can be
built and mounted.
Chapter 7
Chapter 7 concludes our work with recommendations on areas of possible improvement
of Cyber security. We conclude that although a robust design, the current Internet design
has several flaws which have made using it to transact business risk - even with ad-hoc
fixes - and portends enormous implications for Cyber security; and in particular, the
original Internet protocols are not robust communications technology, are unsecured and
can not to be used for business without coupling with extra security measures such as ad-
hoc security fixes which are often very expensive and ever constantly changing and being
re-defined in response to the constantly emerging new threats and Cyber attack types.
1.5 Organization of Document
This submission overview is organized as follows: Chaperl outlines the motivation and
objective of this study. Chapter 2 introduces the reader to background information, Cyber
space, the threats, the "Bolt" and "Nuts" and the current state of the practice is statement
and approach to research. Chapter 3 describes the Internet architecture and security flaws.
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of Internet vulnerabilities and Cyber attacks. Chapter 5
presents a stakeholder analysis of the Internet system. Chapter 6 describes the strategic
implications of the current Internet design for Cyber security. Finally, Chapter 7 presents
the conclusions and summarizes our recommendations.
Chapter 2: Cyber Security
The exponential growth of the Internet has brought about a wave of security breaches on
connected networks and online transactions by Cyber criminals who continue to defeat any
scheme devised to protect Cyberspace. The breaches manifest in different shades and forms, and
have giving rise to an underground economy run by Cyber criminals and powered by Bot-net
Servers and other technologies. This sophisticated underground community is growing faster
than imagined and have been able to defeat any known defense put in place. To stem the tide,
virtually all online users including connected governments, commercial entities are increasingly
implementing security measures to protect their online transactions.
In this Chapter, we will provide background information on Internet evolution and statistics,
define Cyber security, describe Cyberspace security issues and threats, the "Bolts" and "Nuts" of
Cyber Security and the current state of Cyber security practice.
2.1 Background
The Internet connects millions of users and businesses today and has become a vital resource that
is changing the way many businesses and individuals communicate and do business. But, several
issues plague the process as the Intemet suffers from significant and widespread security
problems. For example, many organizations and businesses have been attacked or probed by
intruders, with resultant losses to revenue generation, productivity and reputation. Coupled with
this are myriads of other problems attendant with Internet usage like temporary or prolonged
disconnection from the Internet that are resolved with significant investment of resources to
correct the problems with system and network configurations.
The emergence of Business to Business transactions over Web Sites have increased the
significance of the Internet and often such Websites are unaware or ignorant of these problem
and face the risk of being attacked by network intruders. Even sites that do observe good security
practices face problems with new vulnerabilities in networking software and the persistence of
some intruders.
The fundamental problem here is that the Internet was not designed to be very secure.
Communication is accomplished using protocol suites that are known as the Transport Control
Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). By itself, the protocol suites are plagued with design
and architectural flaws.
Some of the known inherent problems with the current Internet system are:
* The TCP/IP protocol stack has several security issues including the lack of ability to
authenticate thereby serving as a conduit for multiple Cyber attacks.
* Vulnerable TCP/IP services -- a number of the TCP/IP services are not designed to be secure
and can be compromised by knowledgeable intruders; services used for testing are
particularly vulnerable.
e Lack of policy -- many sites are configured unintentionally for wide-open Internet access
without regard for the potential for abuse from the Internet; many sites permit more TCP/IP
services than they require for their operations and do not attempt to limit access to
information about their computers that could prove valuable to intruders, and
e Complexity of configuration -- host security access controls are often complex to configure
and monitor; controls that are accidentally mis-configured can result in unauthorized access.
A more extended description of the Internet system and their weaknesses is given in Section 2 of
this Thesis.
Some of the security issues that result from the Internet system flaws are discussed in the next
Sections.
2.2 Cyberspace and Security Issues
The medium created by the Internet is called Cyberspace and is essentially the global network of
interdependent information technology infrastructures, telecommunications networks and
computer processing systems, which by its very design is free and open to the public.
Computers at Risk', a 1991 report by the Computer Science & Telecommunications Board of the
National Research Council begins:
"We are at risk. Increasingly, America depends on computers. They control power
delivery, communications, aviation, and financial services. They are used to store vital
information, from medical records to business plans to criminal records. Although we
trust them, they are vulnerable-to the effects ofpoor design and insufficient quality
control, to accident, and perhaps more alarmingly, to deliberate attack. The modern
thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun. Tomorrow's terrorist may be able
to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb."
It has been twenty years when these words were written, the first personal computers, web
browsers and networks were still on the drawing board and the Internet was a place for high-tech
aficionados. Since then, we have walked some distance and have come considerably far. Today,
our dependence on inter-networked computing systems means that virtually every walk of life-
whether personal or commercial, public or private, civilian or military-is intermediated by
computer systems. But virtually none of these systems are trustworthy; all are subject to attack;
in fact, many are actively under attack today.
In the last couple of years, several changes brought in IT have changed the nature of Cyberspace
and for that matter have very much made the computing world risky:
Computers at Risk: "Safe Computing in the Information Age," National Academies Press, Washington DC, 1991,
http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record id=1581. Last checked June 12, 2010.
- Novel embedded computing has become part of modem day computing
- Several large network as backbone for connectivity has sprung up and spread on
Cyberspace
- There are now multiple service providers providing links
- Multiple Technologies to support network infrastructure CDMA, VSAT, DSL
- Multiple Applications
The convergence has created complexity of today's network (Figure 1). And, interconnected
networks have grown to several millions.
Figure 1: The Complexity of Today's Network from Gulshan R. (2009)
Not only is there an exponential increase in the number of interconnected networks, businesses
and users but also a growing concern Guishan R. (2009):
(i) That computing and the Internet has turned against us
(ii) With the exponential growth in security incidents with noticeable high profile cases:
Pentagon, US in 2007
Estonia in April 2007
Computer System of German Chancellery and three Ministries
Highly classified computer network in New Zealand & Australia"
(iii)With complex and target oriented software
(iv) With common computing technologies and systems
(v) With constant probing and mapping of network systems
Documented statistical evidence Gulshan R. (2009)2 points to an increasing trend in the nature of
incidents with a greater proportion of incidents attributed to Phishing that is prevalent in
eCommerce.
2% k5%
29%
3%
32%
4%
18%
Phishng - 32%
Spam - 3%
User ount Coprormise - 2%
M Dental of Service - 4% Network ScanninglProbing - 18%
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M Others -5%
Figure 2: Security Incidents reported during 2008 from Gulshan R. (2009).
The statistics points to a very disturbing trend that does not bode well for a world that has come
increasingly depend on Web sites for transacting virtually every type of business.
Gulshan R. (2009) notes that among the trends shaping the future of Cyberspace are:
Ubiquitous computing, networking and mobility
Embedded Computing
Security
Internet Protocol version six (IPv6)
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
2 GuIshan, R. (2009), "Cyber Security: Indian perspective,"
http://www.cyberseminar.cdit.org/pdf/09 02 09/gulshan.pdf. Last checked June 13, 2010.
Table 1: Number of Internet Web sites from Gulshan R. (2009).
Year Number of Web sites
1993 (Web Invented and implemented) 130
1994 2738
1995 23500
2007 550 Million
2008 850 Million
And that, the nature of today's Cyberspace security issues is different from those of yester years;
and more so have become very complex.
- Sophisticated attacks
- Attackers are refining their methods and consolidating assets to create global
networks that support coordinated criminal activity
- Rise of Cyber Spying and Targeted attacks
- Mapping of network, probing for weakness/vulnerabilities
- Malware propagation through Website intrusion
- Large scale Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection attacks like Asprox
Botnet
- Malware propagation through Spam is on the rise
- Storm worm, which is one of the most notorious malware programs seen during
2007-08, circulates through spam
- Phishing
- Increase in cases of fast-flux phishing and rock-phish
- Domain name phishing and Registrar impersonation
- Crimeware
- Targeting personal information for financial frauds
- Information Stealing through social networking sites
- Rise in Attack toolkits
- Toolkits like Mpack and Neospolit can launch exploits for browser and client-side
vulnerabilities against users who visit a malicious or compromised sites
In additionTyber security issues are not localized to a particular nation but are indeed
transglobal. To underscore this, the security lab of the giant security software provider
Websense, Inc. that produces daily aggregated statistics of security events and trends provided
the 2008 overall Cyber attack percentages3 in Figure 3 below.
Attack Percentages
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] 0.03 - 0,24
00.01 -0,02
E 0
Figure 3: Global Attack Trend in 2008 from Websense Report (2008).
The report shows wide spread attacks over several continents. Other statistics and trending
analysis - discussed in Chapter 4 - on the scope, depth and nature of security attacks in
Cyberspace show a similar spread and trend.
2.3 Cyber Security Defined
So then, what is Cyber security?
Cyber security exists in the context of Cyberspace and is the art and practice of implementing
security in Cyberspace. Ordinarily expressed, Cyber security can be defined as the safeguarding
or protection of all things Internet -- from the networks themselves to the information stored in
computer databases and other applications. It forms part of the comprehensive set of coherent
Internet-specific information security practices. It provides the basis to protect the Internet and
its constituent protocols and is an integral part of overall security.
The concept of Cyber security grew out of necessity as the Internet became a medium to transact
businesses and millions of users, business and organizational groups got connected and started
sending more data and processes online. The trend has continued and it's even more crucial now
with the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies, which fosters online collaboration and information
sharing. Also, the need for a secure Internet is underscored by the rapid increase in Cyber
attacks.
3 Websense Report, ( 2008): "Global Attack Trend in 2008," http://securitylabs.websense.com/. Last checked July
6,2010.
In enterprise internetworking, a typical Cyber security implementation will include proper
security design and management for safe, secure, integrated operations; and is realized by setting
organizational security goals, establishing security policies and putting in place risk management
remediation processes to identify and implement needed proactive and corrective measures.
In the end, the objective of cyber security practices is to implement information technology (IT)
security solutions that protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and the
safety and operational effectiveness of process control, as well as to prevent information from
being used to compromise the physical security practices of companies. To be effective, these
controls need to include not only technology, but also processes and people.
2.4 Cyber Security Threats
By functional classification, there are four broad categories of threats: the threat of disruption,
the threat of exploitation, the threat of manipulation, and the threat of destruction.4
Threat of Disruption: These are threats related to the disruption of utilities, communication
flow, economic transactions, public information campaigns, electric power grids, and present
serious economic and political consequence for both the government and private sector entities.
Viruses and denial-of-service attacks are a few of the potent weapons used to accomplish this
category of threat.
Threat of Exploitation: The threat here is exploitation of proprietary or classified information
usually accomplished by Information theft, identity theft, online credit card fraud or theft of
credit card numbers, and theft of national security levels of information (e.g., systematic probing
of classified or unclassified but sensitive government systems).
Occurrences of this type of threat are very difficult to detect and often lead to systems being
compromised; and as with the threat of disruption, the probability of occurrence is high.
The Threat ofManipulation: This category of threat is used to exert influence, retaliate or
leverage some form of advantage or gains by perpetrators. The threat is used to accomplish
political, economic, military, or inflammatory purpose. Several incidents of defaced Web sites
(election campaigns, e-Business sites such as Microsoft, Google, etc. and of altered personal
financial information on e-commerce sites) point to the clear potential for using the Internet as a
powerful tool for manipulating information.
While several instances of manipulation serve the purpose of touting or making a statement, and
can be remedied rapidly, the more dangerous instances can go undetected for a lengthy period of
time including manipulation of financial data, military information, or functional infrastructure
data (e.g., the timing of dam releases).
4 Borchgrave, Cilluffo, Cardash, and Michele, (2000), "Cyber Threats and Information Security Meeting the 21st
Century Challenge," Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2000.
The Threat of Destruction: Destruction to exert economic and security losses is the primary
motive here. Essentially, information, material and critical infrastructure that have harmful
economic and national security consequences are destroyed. Techniques employed include the
disruption using such hacking techniques as logic bombs, virus implantations and Trojan Horses
scheming.
Figure 4: Cyber Threat Evolution from Gulshan R. (2009).
Gulshan R. (2009) opines that the threats highlighted above can be exploited when in-place
security controls are weak resulting to different types of Cyber attacks defined in Table 14
(Appendix 2):
- Web defacement
- Spam
- Spoofing
- Proxy Scan
- Denial of Service
- Distributed Denial of Service
- Malicious Codes ( Virus, Bots)
- Etc.
Specific threat agents have been given by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) in a recent
report provided a description of different types of human threats that forms the larger part of the
human Cyber crime community (see Table 2).
Cyber Threat Evolution
Table 2: Cyber Crime Human Threat Agents5
Threat Description
Bot-network ot-network operators take over multiple systems in order to coordinate attacks and to distribute
operators phishing schemes, spam, and malware attacks. The services of these networks are sometimes made
available on underground markets (e.g., purchasing a denial-of-service attack or servers to relay spain or
phishing attacks).
Criminal Criminal groups seek to attack systems for monetary gain. Specifically, organized crime groups are using
groups spam, phishing, and spyware/malware to commit identity theft and online fraud. International corporate
spies and organized crime organizations also pose a threat to the United States through their ability to
conduct industrial espionage and large-scale monetary theft and to hire or develop hacker talent.
Foreign Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of their information-gathering and espionage
intelligence activities. In addition, several nations are aggressively working to develop information warfre doctrine,
services programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable a single entity to have a significant and serious
impact by disrupting the supply, communications, and economic infrastructures that support military
power-impacts that could affect the daily lives of U.S. citizens across the country.
Hackers Hackers break into networks for the thrill of the challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker
community. While gaining unauthorized access once required a fair amount of skill or computer
knowledge, hackers can now download attack scripts and protocols from the Internet and launch them
against victim sites. Thus, while attack tools have become more sophisticated, they have also become
easier to use. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the large majority of hackers do not have the
requisite expertise to threaten difficult targets such as critical U.S. networks. Nevertheless, the worldwide
population of hackers poses a relatively high threat of an isolated or brief disruption causing serious
damage.
Insiders The disgruntled organization insider is a principal source of computer crime. Insiders may not need a
great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions because their knowledge of a target system often
allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to steal system data. The
insider threat includes contractors hired by the organization as well as employees who accidentally
introduce malware into systems.
Phishers Individuals, or small groups, execute phishing schemes in an attempt to steal identities or information
for monetary gain. Phishers may also use spain and spyware/malware to accomplish their objectives
Spanmers Individuals or organizations distribute unsolicited e-mail with hidden or false information in order to sell
products, conduct phishing schemes, distribute spyware/malware, or attack organizations (i.e., denial of
service).
Malware Individuals or organizations with malicious intent carry out attacks against users by producing and
authors distributing spyware and malware. Several destructive computer viruses and worms have harmed files
and hard drives, including the Melissa Macro Virus, the Explore.Zip worm, the CIH (Chernobyl) Virus,
Ninda, Code Red, Slammer, and Blaster.
Terrorists Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructures in order to threaten national
security, cause mass casualties, weaken the U.S. economy, and damage public morale and confidence.
Terrorists may use phishing schemes or spyware/malware in order to generate funds or gather sensitive
information.
GAO Report Number: GAO-10-628, "Critical Infrastructure Protection," Report to the Congress of the US, July, 2010,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/38237843/GAO-Cyber-Security. Last checked on September 14, 2010.
2.5 Critical Elements: The Bolts and Nuts of Cyber Security
Cyber security, an umbrella term that incorporates different IT strategies to protect networks
comprises several components that address different aspects of network and system
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to launch attacks. These typically revolve around the
security frameworks and techniques that are used to implement protective measures.
Generally, there are ten (10) security domains that form the pipelines or frameworks designating
a particular category of IT security knowledge that we hereby refer to as the "Bolts."
(i) Access Control Systems and Methodology
(ii) Telecommunications and Network Security
(iii)Business Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery Planning
(iv) Security Management Practices
(v) Security Architecture and Models
(vi)Law, Investigation, and Ethics
(vii) Application and Systems Development
(viii) Cryptography
(ix)Computer Operations Security
(x) Physical Security
Each domain represents a distinctive area of Cyber security practice. Within each are several
field practice areas or sub domains. For example, Identity management, a sub domain of access
control systems is a process that incorporates validation methods for individuals accessing the
network to verify they are who they say they are, and then monitors what they do on the
network; Risk management, a sub domain of security management practices mandates
identification of network vulnerabilities and threats and determines appropriate countermeasures
based on the sensitivity of data; Incident management, a sub domain of law, investigation and
ethics frameworks executes responses when security events threaten the network. There are
several other management, operational and technical components that form the concentric circles
within the Information Assurance principle of defense in-depth.
The method for applying the "Bolts" and deploying each mechanism that we hereby refer to as
the "Nut" depends in part on an organization's missions and requirements.
Herbert B. (2008)6 captures the essence of the Defense in-Depth principle (see Figure 4) which
depicts the basic elements of program domains areas that are central to Cyber security best
practices.
6 Herbert, B. (2008), "Security/Cyber Security," International Telecommunication Union Presentation GSC-13 ITU-
T Study Group 17 Presentation GSC13-XXXX-nn. July 1, 2008.
Figure 5: Guidelines for implementing system and network security from Herbert B. (2008).
In practical terms, Defense in Depth entails firmly enforced secure configurations (at installation
time) for all applications, constantly verified patching and upgrading of both applications and
system software, constant vulnerability scanning and rapid resolution of problems found, tightly
configured firewalls and intrusion prevention systems, up-to-date anti-virus and anti-spyware at
gateways as well as on desktops.
For example, on the aspect of access control, the Cyber security best practices pertaining to
Defense in Depth typically would include two-factor authentication, which requires users to
produce two credentials to access a system or application such as a fingerprint scan and a
password or digital signatures, which verify the integrity and origin of a message. And, also
include encryption, which translates data into a secret code so it is readable only by users who
have the key to reassemble the message. These methods must be used in conjunction with
customized information security policies and training. In essence, a holistic approach
encapsulates the practice with different components being either "Bolts" or "Nuts."
Simply put, Defense in Depth is the layering of multiple defense techniques, mechanisms and
devices to protect critical network assets, data, systems and users. These defenses are layered for
two primary reasons: First, as one layer, device or mechanism ("Nut") fails, another will be there
to mitigate, or at least track and notify the administrator, about the breach. Second, as detailed
above, attacks can come from a multitude of sources and can attack multiple methods of access.
One defense mechanism will not address every potential path into the business. Therefore, the
layered architecture provides somewhat of a solid defense.
Given in Figure 6 is a schematic of the layered structure for implementation of defensive
mechanisms (Nuts - Access Control Servers, Firewalls, Routers with ACLs, VPN Servers, etc.)
encapsulating a holistic approach in implementing security to protect data/information.
Defense in Depth emphasizes the triad that is prevention, detection and reaction/response and is
a commonly used approach in IT security to address these principles. Thus, the underpinning and
underlying assumption is that no single mechanism offers adequate protection. Defense in Depth
utilizes multiple "layers" to protect an organization's critical assets. In other words, an attack that
is not stopped by an outer layer will be stopped by an inner layer. And as such, any exploit will
have to break through multiple defense layers for it to be successful.
Although, having a Defense in Depth architecture does not assure an organization that it won't
be attacked, but it does make it as difficult as possible for the attacks that inevitably will occur to
succeed. As attacks get more numerous and more complex, organizations need to develop more
complex defense strategies.
Figure 6: Sample Security Architecture Emphasizing the Defense-in-Depth Concept from Stallings W. (2000).
In Figure 67, a common router and firewall configuration known as the screened subnet is shown.
In this case, the screened subnet has two packet-filtering routers and a firewall. This
configuration creates an isolated subnetwork, which makes the internal network invisible to the
Internet and the inside router advertises only the existence of the screened subnet to the internal
7 Stallings, W. (2000) "'Network Security Essentials," Applications and Standards,' P322-330 Prentice Hall, 2000.
network. Thus, two layers of defense between the outside and the DMZ and three layers between
the outside and the internal secure network are created.
In essence, the concept of Defense-in-Depth in a way encapsulates the requirements that must be
addressed when building a Cyber security architecture. It reflects the totality of enterprise assets
that must be protected and brings into view the concentric and interdependent nature of security
knowledge domain, processes, devices and the technologies that must be deployed to protect the
enterprise from Cyber attacks. Invariably, Defense-in-Depth integrates the "Bolts" with the
"Nuts" to implement Cyber security best practices.
Figure 7 serves to illustrate the "Bolts" and "Nuts" of Cyber security in an enterprise.
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Figure 7: Enterprise Internet System Security Architecture from Stallings W. (2000).
In Figure 7, the "Nuts" are the basic technological devices and mechanisms such as firewalls,
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems, Encryption technologies and other such
technologies and devices which provide protection at the external, intermediate (DMZ) and
internal protected network cycles.
Prominent in the list of devices used to implement Cyber defenses are:
* Routers with Access Control Lists
* Firewalls
* Intrusion Detection Systems
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* Intrusion Prevention Systems
e Encryption Devices (Virtual Private Network)
* Authentication and Access Control Servers
e Cryptographic Mechanisms
* Digital Certificate Devices
" Etc.
2.6 The Current State of Cyber Security Practice in the Enterprise
The current state of Cyber security practice is generally considered matured and advanced from
where it was five years ago. This has been made possible by avances in newly developed
security technologies. For example, intrusion detection systems that were the industry norm for
well over eight (8) years have been refined to include new features that when in operation makes
it possible to detect intrusion essentially giving birth to a new device popularly known as
intrusion prevention system.
By all accounts, the current state is a reflection of the industry "Best Practices" (BPs) which are
constrained and by and large are a reflection of what can be implemented, and not by theoretical
or hypothetical potential solutions. While BPs have attained a uniform industry standard with
marketplace acceptance of such Standards as NIST, ISO, etc. there are still subtle differences and
nuances in implementation from organization to organization.
In general, Hancock B. (2003)8 asserts "BPs, as delivered, are best implemented under the
following general driving principles:
1. Defense-in-Depth (layered defense). Singular, point-based security solutions can be
breached or circumvented. Proper cyber security means that multiple layers of defense
need to be implemented to safeguard assets. In this manner, if a particular layer is
breached or circumvented, the next security layer will catch the breach and provide
adequate security to protect the asset or will delay asset compromise until security teams
can properly address the problem presented by the breach or bypass. An example might
be to disable TELNET (virtual terminal) access through a router to a web site (this can be
done through the implementation of Access Control Lists (ACLs) or packet port filters in
an IP-based router). Additionally, proper security would include a firewall in front of the
web site where TELNET would similarly be disabled and also have an operator
notification alarm implemented in case of attempted access. If, later the network
management team or security team were presented with a TELNET attempted access
alarm from the firewall, they would quickly deduce that the router was somehow either
breached or bypassed and an attacker attempted to go through the firewall which, as a
layered defense mechanism, denied access to the assets. This allows for continual
protection of the assets on the network and a rapid response to security events when they
8 Hancock, B. (2003) "Summary Report and Proposals from Cyber Security Best Practices", Focus Group of
Network Reliability and Interoperability Council, Homeland Defense, March 14, 2003 V1.3
occur. Furthermore, layered defenses can be implemented with existing infrastructure
components and do not always require multiple, specialized security technology layers.
2. Minimization of exposure. A great many breaches happen because technologies that are
not needed are left connected or remain otherwise accessible to external attackers.
Minimization of exposure (capability minimization) is a widely known security concept
where items that are not needed are disabled and technologies that are not required are
removed. Another popular statement for this type of concept of least privilege, "deny all
except what which is needed" from accessing network infrastructure. Exposure is
minimized by "turning off' technologies, applications, etc., which is not needed to fulfill
the company's mission or deliverables. For instance, sites with Internet connectivity
would disable all access "ports" (applications) which are not used so that those "ports"
could not be used by attackers to gain access to the infrastructure. Companies who fared
well in the January 25, 2003, "Slammer" worm attack did so because they denied access
to UDP ports 1433 and 1434 as part of their implementation best practices in network
router, firewall and switch configurations. When the worm hit the infrastructure, it could
not propagate through these ports because the principle of least privilege was in effect,
effectively stopping the worm in its tracks. By disabling technology access where it is not
needed, many access opportunities into the infrastructure are effectively disabled, in turn
reducing opportunity for further attacks.
3. Partitioning and isolation. If complete access to all devices on a network is available to
virtually any entity, the whole network can be disabled if the infrastructure is attacked in
even simplistic ways. Traditional belief of only securing endpoints and the application
has been proven by recent experiences not to work. Isolating critical components and
partitioning the network infrastructure into smaller, protected areas, the opportunity to
critically affect an entire network is dramatically reduced and network reliability is
increased. This also helps isolate Cyber attacks in progress (by restricting Cyber attacks
to known, bounded network locations that can be protected effectively while the Cyber
attack on another section of the infrastructure is being dealt with.) An example might be
to isolate network management out-of-band networks from general production or general
access networks and further restrict access to the out-of-band network. In this manner, if
one of the production networks is attacked, the out-of-band management network allows
critical access to network technologies and the opportunity to assist in the management
and eradication of the Cyber attack. Also, by establishing partitioning "zones" in the
infrastructure, they can be disconnected from sections being attacked and continue to
operate while an attack is in progress.
4. Keep It Simple, Stupid (KISS). This tried and true concept applies well to technologies
where the complexity makes it vulnerable to attack(s). In cases where security is needed,
application of less complexity is always preferred. As an example, blocking an
application port on a router is a simple operation and much easier to do than installation
of complex stateful filtering software on a server.
5. Information Technology Hygiene. Many breaches of network infrastructures are due to
lack of good, basic Information Technology (IT) security concepts and products. For
instance, network managers place a great deal of sensitive and critical information on
their access systems (typically a laptop or notebook computer) with no external network
controls (firewall), no strong authentication (e.g. token cards), encryption of on-system
sensitive data, etc. Other examples include critical servers not being backed up,
unnecessary services being made available, falling behind on patch management,
inadequate risk assessment and classification of data, open file servers, database servers
and email systems that are easily compromised and contain extensive information about
the company, its infrastructure and its customers. Enforcement of proper IT security has
a profound effect on overall security of network infrastructures.
6. Avoid security by obscurity. A common and grossly inadequate belief is that lack of
general visage of a component is a security feature (if you can't see it, you won't try to
attack it). BPs stress actions to protect infrastructures, not inactions or obscurity as a
defensive tool. For instance, network address translation (NAT) technology is often
promoted by some vendors as a security method with the principle being that a single
external IP address "hides" internal private IP addresses via a translation system. It has
been proven, painfully, time and time again that NAT is a fine technology to extend
addressing ranges of networks to include unregistered and private address ranges to
interoperate with registered IP address ranges. At the same time, NAT is often breached
or bypassed by attackers to reach internal systems on a network and breach same.
Security via obscurity is a bad idea at all times and is not included, encouraged or
recommended as a technique for securing infrastructure.
In the end, due to the nature of Cyber threats and attacks, BPs are never implemented the same
way across organizations, are never intended for mandatory regulatory efforts, as not all are
appropriate for all services or architectural implementations.
2.7 Summary
In this Chapter, we have reviewed and provided background information related to the Internet
as a medium of conducting online transactions. Following this review, we conclude that this
medium otherwise known as Cyberspace is not sufficiently secure as several security breaches
occur over it leading to several unintended consequences including unauthorized disclosure of
proprietary and personal data/information, shutting down of businesses, data theft, financial loss,
etc.
Also, we note that an information security practice also known as Cyber security has evolved
over the years to address security issues in Cyberspace, and as is practiced today represents
different standards and norms each of which is interpreted and implemented to the extent
permissible by organizational resources and constraints. We conclude that although still
inadequate to stem the tide, significant progress has been made and is evident in the current state
of Cyber security practice.
Chapter 3: The Internet Design Security Flaws
The Internet architecture represents several software, hardware/infrastructure and link sub-
systems that all fuse together to make a single whole. The current design grew out of the DOD
DARPA project that was initially intended for lightweight use for a few connected networks. But
today, it has grown to a collection of several millions of networks and connected systems by far
exceeding its growth projection. This growth taps into and has been fostered by the robustness of
the Internet design which has made it possible for new applications, processes and technologies
to be deployed. Incidentally, most of these technologies are developed without security in mind
and have thus given rise to all sorts of Cyberspace security problems.
In this Chapter, we present an overview of the Internet architecture and design, with a particular
emphasis on the TCP/IP protocol stack that serves as the transport and communication
mechanism of the system. We provide a description and analysis the flaws and weaknesses
inherent in the current Internet system architecture and then provide details of well-known threat
agents that have exploited the weaknesses to launch Cyber attacks. The facts established in this
Chapter provide the basis for the discussions in Chapter 4.
3.1: Overview of Internet Design
The origin and evolution of the Internet, its current architecture and design has been extensively
covered in documented literature available online and elsewhere. The Internet design can be
described from two perspectives:
1. Hardware
2. Autonomous Systems
When viewed in terms of hardware, the Internet consists of hosts or endpoints (also called end
systems), routers or internal switching stations (also referred to as gateways), and links that
connect the various hosts and/or routers and can differ widely in speed (from slow modem
connection to high-speed backbone links) as well as in technology (e.g., wired, wireless, satellite
communication).
When viewed from the perspective of autonomous systems (ASs), where an AS is a collection of
routers and links under a single administrative domain, the network is an internetwork consisting
of a number of separate subnetworks or Ass (Figure 8), interlinked to give users the illusion of a
single, seamlessly connected network (network of networks, or "internet").
In other words, the infrastructure of the Internet consists of a federation of connected networks
that are each independently managed ("autonomous system"). Each "autonomous system may
consist of multiple IP networks, and have a number (AS number). The autonomous systems
represent a hierarchy of network service providers (NSPs):
* Tier-1: nation or worldwide network (US: less than 20)
" Tier-2: regional networks (in US: less than 100)
e Tier-3: local Internet service provider (in US: several thousand)
Figure 8: Internet Infrastructure.9
Historically, today's Internet system evolved from the architectural network design that was
developed in the 1970s under the auspices of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA) of the US Department of Defense. Clark D. (1988)10 of Massachusetts Institute of
Technology has elaborated on the early reasoning behind the design philosophy that shaped the
Internet protocol architecture (i.e., the "Internet architecture" as it became known).
In general, the Internet architecture is a reflection of how it is designed to work and includes both
a technical design and a management structure.
The technical design is a complex meshing and interlocking set of hierarchical tree-like
structures, like Internet Protocol addresses and domain names, mixed with networked structures
like packet switching and routing protocols, all tied together with millions of lines of
sophisticated software that continues to get better all the time.
The management structure consists of a generally democratic collection of loosely-coupled
organizations and working groups with mostly non-overlapping responsibilities.
In essence, the Internet design is a combination of management and technical structures that
must work well together to provide a reliable, powerful communication platform upon which the
rest of the complex Internet system is built.
9 The Internet lecture notes published at: www.cs.virginia.edu/-cs458/slides/moduleO4-internetV2.ppt. Last
checked September, 2010.
0 D. D. Clark, (1988). "The design philosophy of the DARPA Internet protocols," Proceedings of the ACM
SIGCOMM'88, in: ACM Computer Communication Reviews, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 106{114}, 1988.
So, what is the Internet architecture? Carpenter B. (1996) " in his paper titled: "Architectural
Principles of the Internet" notes:
"Fortunately, nobody owns the Internet, there is no centralized control, and nobody can turn it
off Its evolution depends on rough consensus about technical proposals, and on running code.
Engineering feed-backfrom real implementations is more important than any architectural
principles."
Further, Carpenter notes that the lack of ownership of the Internet that has resulted into the
collaborative architectural design by different stakeholders that now define the Internet.
The IAB (Internet Architecture Board) - the Internet Society is the overseer of the technical
evolution of the Internet that supervises the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) thiat is
tasked with overseeing the evolution of TCP/IP, and the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
which works on network technology. The IAB defines the Internet Architecture as "a meta-
network, a constantly changing collection of thousands of individual networks
intercommunicating with a common protocol."
Going by the above definition, several graphicalization of the Internet architecture abound. A
more vivid description and visualization has been given by Haynal, R. (2010).12
Haynal portrays the Internet architecture as an assembly that consists of several Sections:
. User PC - Multi-Media PCs equipped to send and receive all variety of audio and video
. User Communication Equipment - Connects the Users' PC(s) to the "Local Loop"
. Local Loop Carrier - Connects the User location to the ISP's Point of Presence
. ISP's POP - Connections from the user are accepted and authenticated here.
. User Services - Used by the User for access (DNS, EMAIL, etc).
. ISP Backbone - Interconnects the ISP's POPs, AND interconnects the ISP to Other ISP's
and online content.
. Online Content - These are the host sites that the user interacts with.
. Origins Of Online Content - This is the original "real-world" sources for the online
information.
Each of the Sections provided elaboration of the different components. For example, the User PC
Section listed the architectural components as follows:
User PC - A Multi-Media PC equipped to send and receive all variety of audio and video.
1. Sound Board /Microphone/Speakers for telephony, MIDI, Creative Labs/SoundBlaster,
Yahoo's List for Sound Cards.
2. Video/Graphics for 3D graphics, video, playback. Matrox, Diamond Multimedia,
Yahoo's List for Video Cards.
" RFC 1958; B. Carpenter; Architectural Principles of the Internet; June, 1996.
12 Haynal, R (2010), "Internet: The Big Picture: What are the major pieces of the Internet, and who are the major
players in each segment." http://navigators.com/internet architecture.html. Last checked in October, 2010.
3. Video camera - Connectix Yahoo's List for Video Conferencing, Yahoo's List for
Manufacturers.
4. Voice recognition - Yahoo's List for Voice Recognition.
And, visualizes the user PC in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Sample Internet Sub-sectional Architecture from Haynal R. (2010).
Another description takes a cue from the coinage of the word Internet which is a short from of
the compound word "inter-networking," and the architecture is based on the very specification of
the standard TCP/IP protocol, designed to connect any two networks which may be very
different in internal hardware, software, and technical design. Once two networks are
interconnected, communication with TCP/IP is enabled end-to-end, so that any node on the
Internet has the near magical ability to communicate with any other no matter where they are. It
is this very structure that has made Internet architects assert that this openness of design has
enabled the Internet architecture to grow to a global scale.
Topologically, the Internet technical architecture looks like a multi-dimensional river system,
with small tributaries [Figure 10] feeding medium-sized streams feeding large rivers. For
example, an individual's access to the Internet is often from home over a modem to a local
Internet service provider who connects to a regional network connected to a national network. At
the office, a desktop computer might be connected to a local area network with a company
connection to a corporate Intranet connected to several national Internet service providers. In
general, small local Internet service providers connect to medium-sized regional networks which
connect to large national networks, which then connect to very large bandwidth networks on the
Internet backbone. Most Internet service providers have several redundant network cross-
connections (Figure 8) to other providers in order to ensure continuous availability.
Figure 10: Tributary visualization of the various routes through a portion of the Internet. 3
3.1.1: The Transport Control Protocol /Internet Protocol
The architecture of the TCP/IP protocol stack, the main stack of protocols used in the Internet is
very-well described in several technical literatures. The five-layer TCP/IP protocol suite consists
(from the bottom up) of the physical, link, internetwork, transport, and application layers.' 4
The physical layer concerns the physical aspects of data transmission on a particular link, such as
characteristics of the transmission medium, the nature of the signal, and data rates. Above the
physical layer is the link layer. Its mechanisms and protocols (e.g., signaling rules, frame
formats, media-access control) control how packets are sent over the raw media of individual
links.
Above it is the internetwork layer, responsible for getting a packet through an internet; that is, a
series of networks with potentially very different bit-carrying infrastructures and possibly
belonging to different administrative domains. The Internet Protocol (IP) is the internetworking
protocol for TCP/IP, and its main task is to adequately implement all the mechanisms necessary
to knit together divergent networking technologies and administrative domains into a single
virtual network (an "Internet") so as to enable data communication between sending and
receiving hosts, irrespective of where in the network they are.
The layer above IP is the transport layer, where the most commonly used Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) deals, among other issues, with end-to-end congestion control and assures that
arbitrarily large streams of data are reliably delivered and arrive at their destination in the order
sent.
13 http://www.opte.org/maps/. Last checked on November 25, 2010.
14 Stallings, W. (2006), Data and Computer Communications, Prentice Hall 2006, ISBN 0-13-243310-9
Finally, the top layer in the TCP/IP protocol suite is the application layer, which contains a range
of protocols that directly serve the user; e.g., telnet (for remote login), ftp (the File Transfer
Protocol for transferring files, smtp (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol for e-mail), http (the
HyperText Transfer Protocol for the World Wide Web).
The essence of layering and stratification of functions of the stack is aimed at simplifying,
satisfying the various demands and driving efficiency of the process. Willinger W. et. al (2002)"1
explains this as follows: "this layered modularity gave rise to the "hourglass" metaphor for the
Internet architecture the creation of a multi-layer suite of protocols, with a generic packet
(datagram) delivery mechanism as a separate layer at the hourglass' waist. This abstract bit-level
network service at the hourglass' waist is provided by IP and ensures the critical separation
between an ever more versatile physical network infrastructure below the waist and an ever-
increasing user demand for higher-level services and applications above the waist."
Because several devices are used to realize the processed, all Internet infrastructure providers
conform to agreed upon standards to ensure consistency of the IP. The standards consist of an
agreed-upon set of features that has to be implemented according to an Internet-wide standard,
and must be supported by all the routers in the network. This becomes the key to enabling
communication (Figure 11) across the global Internet so that networking boundaries and
infrastructures remain transparent to the users.
As a result of user and operational requirements, the roles assigned to each layer in the strata
define their robust functionality of the designs to varying degrees. Willinger et al. (2002) asserts:
" The layers below the waist (i.e., physical, and link) deal with the wide variety of existing
transmission and link technologies and provide the protocols for running IP over whatever bit-
carrying network infrastructure is in place ("IP over everything"). Aiming for a somewhat
narrow waist reduces for, or even removes from the typical user the need to know about the
details of and differences between these technologies (e.g., Ethernet local area networks (LAN),
asynchronous transfer mode (ATM), and frame relay) and administrative domains. Above the
waist is where enhancements to IP (e.g., TCP) are provided that simplify the process of writing
applications through which users actually interact with the Internet ("everything over IP"). In this
case, providing for a thin waist of the hourglass removes from the network providers the need to
constantly change their infrastructures in response to a steady flow of innovations happening at
the upper layers within the networking hierarchy (e.g., the emergence of "killer apps" such as e-
mail, the Web, or Napster). The fact that this hourglass design predated some of the most popular
communication technologies, services, and applications in use today and that within today's
Internet, both new and old technologies and services can coexist and evolve attests to the vision
of the early architects of the Internet when deciding in favor of the layering principle. "IP over
everything and everything over IP" results not only in enormous robustness to changes below
and above the hourglass' waist but also provides the flexibility needed for constant innovation
and entrepreneurial spirit at the physical substrate of the network as well as at the application
layer."
15 Willinger, W and Doyle, J (2002), "Robustness and the Internet: Design and Evolution," AT&T Labs-Research,
Florham Park, NJ, USA, March 1, 2002
Table 3: The TCP/IP Protocol Stack. 1 6
Protocol Layer
Application Protocols Layer
Host to Host or Transport Layer
Internet Layer
Network Access Layer
Physical Layer
Comments
Protocols specific to applications such as WWW, e-mail, FTP, etc.
TCP directs packets to a specific application on a computer using a port
number.
IP directs packets to a specific computer using an IP address.
The network access layer is concerned with the exchange of data between a
data transmission device (workstation, computer) and a transmission medium or
network.
Converts binary packet data to network signals and back.
(E.g. Ethernet network card, modem for phone lines, etc.)
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Figure 11: Communication Flow in another version (RFC 1122, Internet STD 3 (1989) four
layer) of the TCP/IP Protocol Suite.'
16 Tanenbaum, A. (2002), Computer Networks, Prentice Hall 2002, ISBN 0-13-066102-3
17 Internet Engineering Task Force, RFC 1122. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1122. Last Checked January 7, 2011.
3.2: The Design Flaws
In order to understand the security problems associated with TCP/IP, we summarize in the
following Sections some of the known security flaws of the Internet communication protocols:
(i) TCP/IP protocol suite for the well-known vulnerabilities of both TCP/IP itself, and
(ii) Some protocols commonly used along with TCP/IP such as DNS, and
(iii)The Internet routing and messaging protocols such as the RIP.
3.2.1: The Communication Protocols (TCP/IP) Flaws
The TCP/IP protocols are the main transport and communication mechanisms used to transact
business on the Internet. As the backbone of the internet," it is comprised of two protocols, TCP
and IP. The design details are given for IP in [RFC 791], and for TCP in [RFC 793]. In their
original design, they lack the most basic mechanisms for security, such as authentication or
encryption. As usage of the Internet and TCP/IP protocols increase, their lack of in-built security
becomes more and more problematic.
The evolution and growth of these protocols follows the evolution and growth of the Internet.
Between 1980 and 1985, specifications were completed for the TCP and IP protocols. Then, the
specifications were made for small network sizes which reflected the original intent of the role of
the Internet i.e. interconnection of small research networks. But, over the past decades, the
Internet has grown from a small network connecting a small community of researchers to its
present state - a gigantic global network connecting people of all types. As such, it may be said
that it evolved from a specialized project to a general-purpose tool.
At the same time, the growth of the Internet has created' enormous security problems with wide
ranging implications. One of the causes being that the TCP and IP protocols were designed when
the Internet was small, and users generally trusted each other and as there were not the need for
many features that are desirable or needed on an insecure network in today's big and extended
interconnections.
A good description of the TCP/IP flaws, their manifestations and types are given in Appendix
1 .18
18 Chris Chambers, Justin Dolske, and Jayaraman Iyer: "TCP/IP Security," Department of Computer and
Information Science, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210 Available at:
http://www.linuxsecurity.com/resource files/documentation/tcpip-security.html. Last checked January, 2011.
3.2.2. The Domain Name System Flaw
The Domain Name Service ("DNS") (Figure 12) is an indispensable protocol widely used on the
Internet to map hostnames (i.e. "foo.bar.com") to IP addresses (i.e. 192.34.12.7), and also to execute
the reverse mapping of IP addresses to hostnames. An attacker can use the latter property to fool
name-based authentication 9.
For example, Bellovin S. (1989) asserts: "an administrator at alice.bar.com may decide to allow
only local connections. This is often specified by name, such as "allow *.bar.com," rather than by
IP address. Name-based authentication is easier to read, and allows easier administration if a
domain contains multiple ranges of IP addresses. When a connection is established with
alice.bar.com, alice uses DNS to convert tfie source IP address on the connection to a name, which
is then checked using whatever form of name-based authentication the administrators have
installed. If an attacker has access to their local DNS server, they can cause DNS queries on their
IP address to reply with any hostname and domain! So, an attacker who knows that alice.bar.com
trusts connections from within *.bar.com can alter his DNS server so that his IP address appeared
to map to "trustme.bar.com"."
Also, other fundamental flaws such as 'ache poisoning exist in the DNS protocol with far
reaching implications. In the cache poisoning attacks, data is introduced into a DNS name
server's cache (djbdns, PowerDNS, MaraDNS, and Unbound) database that did not originate
from authoritative DNS sources. Equally, for Internet-based applications that rely on the DNS
Server(s) to locate their peers, a wide range of attacks such as web site impersonation, email
interception, and authentication bypass are inherently possible. A more accurate description of
these has been given elsewhere by Bellovin S. (1989) and others.
19 Bellovin, S. (1989), "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite", ACM Computer Communications Review,
Volume 19, Number 2, pp. 32-48, April 1989.
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The lack of unique identifiers
During the incubation period (1980's) of the Internet, an IP address is used to safely identify and
locate a host. Addresses were both spatially unique (no one else had an identical address) and
temporally unique (addresses didn't change). However, this is no longer the case [RFC2 101].
Today, IP addresses may exhibit seemly strange behavior that makes identifying and locating
hosts much harder. The widespread use of protocols such as PPP/SLIP [RFC 1990] and DHCP
[RFC 1541] allow a specific host's address to change over time: per-connection in the case of
PPP/SLIP, while DHCP allows hosts to "lease" IP addresses for arbitrary lengths of time. On
even larger time scales, details in the current Internet routing structure (i.e., Classless
InterDomain Routing, "CIDR" [RFC 1519]) may require that if a domain changes service
providers, they will have to change their assigned range of IP addresses. Firewalls, proxy socket
servers, and other "Network Address Translators" further complicate the use of IP addresses as
identifiers, because they may translate addresses as traffic moves between the internal and
external networks. Different hosts may appear to be using identical IP addresses, or different IP
addresses may be the same host.
20 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain Name System. Last checked January 31, 2011.
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Thus, IP addresses can no longer be used to uniquely identify a host, even over short time
periods. And on that account, any security schemes which rely upon IP addresses remaining
temporally or spatially unique may have vulnerabilities.
3.2.3. Internet Routing and Messaging Protocol Flaws
Two major types of attacks are common in Internet Infrastructures: Routing Information Protocol
("RIP") and Internet Control Message Protocol ("ICMP"). Bellovin S. (1989) has described these
as follows:
1. Routing (RIP)
In a narrow context, Routing Information Protocol ("RIP") attacks are part of the extended
security problem associated with the Internet infrastructure. Even though, it is not strictly a
component of TCP/IP, the RIP is often an essential component in a TCP/IP network [RFC1058].
RIP is used to distribute routing information within networks, such as shortest-paths, and
advertising routes out from the local network.
Similar to the TCP/IP, it has no built in authentication, and the information provided in a RIP
packet is often used without verifying it. Attacks on RIP Bellovin S. (1989) are different from
those of other common attacks because RIP attacks change where data goes to, not where it came
from. For example, an attacker could forge a RIP packet, claiming his host "X" has the fastest
path out of the network. All packets sent out from that network would then be routed through X,
where they could be modified or examined. An attacker could also use RIP to effectively
impersonate any host, by causing all traffic sent to that host to be sent to the attacker's machine
instead.
2. ICMP
The Internet Control Message Protocol ("ICMP") is one of the most indispensable messaging
protocols used by the IP layer to send one-way informational messages to a host. Its utility value
lies in one of the most common (and well-known) diagnostics uses of ICMP is the "ping" utility.
This utility sends an ICMP "Echo Request" to a host, and waits for that host to send back an
ICMP "Echo Reply" message. Other messages in ICMP are of similar complexity; that is, they
are all quite simple. It's not surprising that there is no authentication in ICMP, which leads to
attacks using ICMP that can result in a denial of service, or allowing the attacker to intercept
packets.
The devastating "Denial of Service" attacks primarily use either the ICMP "Time exceeded" or
"Destination unreachable" messages. The "Time exceeded" message indicates that the Time-To-
Live field in the IP header has expired; this can normally be caused by routing loops or trying to
reach a host that is extremely distant. "Destination unreachable" messages can have several
meanings (based on a sub-field in the ICMP message), but all basically indicate that packets
cannot successfully be sent to the desired host. Both of these ICMP messages can cause a host to
immediately drop a connection (this is the desired result if the ICMP message is legitimate). An
attacker can make use of this by simply forging one of these ICMP messages, and sending it to
one or both of the communicating hosts. Their connection will then be broken.
Also, ICMP messages can also be used to intercept packets. For example, the ICMP "Redirect"
message is commonly used by gateways when a host has mistakenly assumed the destination is
not on the local network (and is thus attempting to send the packet via the gateway to). Similar to
the RIP, an attacker forges an ICMP "Redirect" message, it can cause another host to send
packets for certain connections through the attacker's host. The only distinction between the RIP
and ICMP is that the ICMP messages only apply to existing connections, and the attacker (the
host receiving redirected packets) must be on a local network.
3.2.4. The Lack of Authentication Mechanism: Fundamental Design Security Architecture Flaw
Good Architecting is one of the principles of architecture and is an embodiment of an ideal
system. Arguably, it is also the most important principle that guides system design.
Several other principles such as the principle of Scalability espouses that a good architecture
must be scalable enough to accommodate both design and business needs; and Flexibility
espouses that System architecture must be flexible enough to be redesigned and improved all
play significant role when the Internet architecture is viewed or analyzed from a holistic
perspective. The Internet architecture embodies all of these.
However, several loopholes have been found in the architecture relating to the frequent break-ins
to distort or alter communication and wreck havocs on connected users and systems. At the root
of this is the lack of an authentication mechanism that could forestall such break-ins.
On this, one of the Internet's "elder statesmen," MIT's David D. Clark-" argues that the Internet
has become a vast patchwork offirewalls, antispam programs, and software add-ons, with no
overall security plan.
As an after-thought, the statement by Clark is a reflection of today's Internet architecture that
lacks the basic security authentication platform.
As a consequence, Clark notes: "The Net's basic flaws cost firms billions, impede innovation,
and threaten national security. It's time for a clean-slate approach."
The underpinning here is that there are far reaching implications drivable for the current Internet
architecture and that the Internet's shortcomings have resulted in plunging security and a
decreased ability to accommodate new technologies. "We are at an inflection point, a revolution
point," Clark now argues (from Talbot, 2005). And he delivers a strikingly pessimistic
assessment of where the Internet will end up without dramatic intervention. "We might just be at
the point where the utility of the Internet stalls -- and perhaps turns downward."
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The basic issue here is the Internet architecture lacked the mechanism to enforce security to
adaptable new technologies that are integrated into it. For example, the TCP/IP; DNS and all
other Internet communications protocols, sub-systems or applications have any mechanism to
authentication even with the proliferation of Internet applications over the years (wireless
devices, peer-to-peer file-sharing, telephony) companies and network engineers came up with
ingenious and expedient patches, plugs, and workarounds.
As a consequence, there is an astronomical growth in the number of security incidents relating to
Cyber attacks (viruses, spam, phishing, etc,) and there is no permanent effective defense leaving
engineers with the arduous tasks of endlessly implementing ad-hoc solutions for protection with
firewalls and antispam software as add-ons and security patches.
3.2.5. Summary
In this Chapter, we have described the weaknesses inherent in the architecture and design of the
TCP/IP protocol suite; and have analyzed documented evidence on the vulnerabilities which are
exploited by the threat agents given Table 2 to launch Cyber attacks.
The Domain Name System is discussed in the context of its architecture and weaknesses that
also serves as another conduit pipe for certain types of Cyber attacks.
We also establish the following:
1. Robustness: The Internet design manifests a robust architecture that is elastic enough to
integrate new processes, applications and technologies.
2. Efficiency: The layered architecture is intended to provide efficiency through roles
assignment.
3. Platform Independence and IP Layer: The Internet Protocol (IP) is the internetworking
protocol for TCP/IP, and its main task is to adequately implement all the mechanisms
necessary to knit together divergent networking technologies and administrative domains
into a single virtual network (an "internet") so as to enable data communication between
sending and receiving hosts, irrespective of where in the network they are.
4. TCP Layer: The layer above IP is the transport (TC) layer, where the most commonly
used Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) deals, among other issues, with end-to-end
congestion control and assures that arbitrarily large streams of data are reliably delivered
and arrive at their destination in the order sent.
5. Application Layer: Also, the top layer in the TCP/IP protocol suite is the application
layer, which contains a range of protocols that directly serve the user; e.g., telnet (for
remote login), ftp (the File Transfer Protocol for transferring files, smtp (Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol for e-mail), http (the HyperText Transfer Protocol for the World Wide
Web).
Chapter 4: Analysis of Internet Vulnerabilities and Cyber Attacks
The increasing use of Cyberspace to engage in all sorts of human endeavor including eBusiness,
online education, etc. provides abundant opportunities for both the good and bad guys to engage
in any desired activities. Sometimes, the activities are essentially Cyber attacks by the bad guys
on vulnerable systems using all available means and technologies to exploit the weaknesses
discussed in Chapter 3.
With each passing year, these attacks have progressively increased in number, scope and nature
giving rise to new lines of Cyber security businesses and practices including reconnaissance and
monitoring set up by several Internet security organizations to monitor internet traffic across the
globe and provide daily or periodic listing of top vulnerabilities and attacks.
In this Chapter, we will analyze Internet traffic monitoring reports from several organizations
and published statistical studies on Cyber attacks; and then develop a grid that maps each attack
type to specific internet layer.
4.1 Internet Vulnerabilities
The number, types and nature of Internet vulnerabilities are not and cannot be completely known
or predicted due to the nature of several complex elements at play such as complex network
environments, poorly understood Cyber space architecture, etc. The lack of the ability to predict
vulnerabilities is precisely the reason there are "Zero-day" attacks. Zero-day attacks are
previously unknown attacks with no immediate defense.
Different Internet security monitoring organizations provide daily or periodic listing of top
vulnerabilities. The list change frequently as new vulnerabilities are discovered all the time from
almost all major software and hardware vendors providing the software, hardware or links that
powers the Internet.
One of the best sources featuring a comprehensive listing of Internet vulnerabilities is Mitre
corporation's "Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures" listing available at http://cve.mitre.org.
The organization maintains lists pulled from different sources and has always been the most
authoritative source of virtually any known and documented vulnerabilities. Other organizations
within the commercial Cyber security practice space also maintain the listing.
4.2 Statistical Data
In the past, many organizations have been reluctant to report attacks. But recently, statistical data
are beginning to emerge, that allows for the quantitative analysis of cyber incident data. By
inception, it could be said that organized incident data reporting and compilation began with
Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center (CERT/CC) in Pittsburgh, which
was created in 1988. Ever since then, CERT/CC has been the largest collector of cyber incidents.
For example, a total of 319,992 incidents were reported to CERT/CC during 1988-2003
(CERT/CC, 2004 - http://www.cert.org/stats/).
Also, several other security organizations have also started collecting and analyzing Cyber attack
data and have established monitoring units within their practices to track computer incidents and
provide both quantitative and qualitative analysis to be used for Cyber defense research and
planning. Among the leading organizations that provide daily, quarterly, yearly and other
periodic reports are:
1. Computer Security Institute and the FBI - (joint effort)
2. The US Department of Homeland Security (National Vulnerability Database)
3. Symantec Intelligence Quarterly
4. Security Lab (by Positive Technologies)
5. IBM Internet Security Systems
6. Websense
7. SANS Institute
8. The Rand Corporation,
9. Arbor Networks
10. McAfee, Inc.
11. Etc.
All of these organizations have organized Cyber threat and attacks monitoring around somewhat
of "Security Operation Centers" that deploy thousands of sensors to monitor all Internet traffic.
The tools used are generally referred to as Monitoring Devices and are essentially intrusion
detection systems (IDSs) (Figure 13)22.
By definition, an IDS is a security technology that attempts to identify and isolate "intrusions"
against computer systems, i.e. the IDS monitors computer systems and network traffic and
analyzes that traffic for possible hostile attacks originating from outside the organization and
also for system misuse or attacks originating from inside the organization. Given the above, the
main task of the IDS is to defend the computer system by detecting and possibly repelling attacks
to it.
22 Iheagwara, C. (2004), "The Effectiveness of Intrusion Detection Systems, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glamorgan,
Wales, Great Britain, 2004.
Figure 13: A sample IDS from Iheagwara C. (2004).
At the component level (Fig. 13) the IDS always has its core element - a sensor (an analysis
engine) - that is responsible for detecting intrusions. This sensor contains decision-making
mechanisms regarding intrusions. Sensors receive raw data from three major information
sources: own IDS knowledge base, syslog and audit trails. The syslog may include, for example,
configuration of file system, user authorizations etc. This information creates the basis for a
further decision-making process.
The component/mechanism responsible for data/information collection is integrated with the
sensor (Fig. 14) - an event generator. The method of collection is determined by the event
generator (which is usually the operating system, network or application) policy that defines the
filtering mode of event notification information and produces a policy-consistent set of events
that may be a log (or audit) of system events, or network packets. Storage of the policy set can
either be in the protected system or outside.
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Figure 14: IDS components from Iheagwara C. (2004).
IDPs operate on similar principles and there are variations in technologies based on vendor
offerings. Integral to their design are different components performing different roles. For
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detection, a detection policy database (an information repository) is used for analysis by the
analyzer. A typical content includes the following:
e Attack signatures
" Normal behavior profiles, and
e Necessary parameters for example, thresholds.
Additionally, the database holds IDP configuration parameters, including modes of
communication with the response module. Also, the sensor also has its own database containing
the dynamic history of potential complex intrusions.
The private Sector organizations mentioned above deploy their monitoring devices in several
Internet backbone locations around the world each using different proprietary technologies that
functions on the principles of the IDP.
For example, the Websense@ Security LabsTM uses the Websense ThreatSeeker@ Network
located on different Internet locations to discover, classify, and monitor global Internet threats
and trends. Featuring the world's first Internet HoneyGridTM, the system uses hundreds of
technologies including honeyclients, honeypots, reputation systems, machine learning, and
advanced grid computing systems to parse through more than 1 billion pieces of content daily,
searching for security threats.
The ThreatSeeker Network scans more than 40 million websites for malicious code and
nearly 10 million emails for unwanted content and malicious code every hour. Using more
than 50 million real-time data collecting systems, it monitors and classifies Web, email, and
data content. Together with the Websense Advanced Classification Engine (ACE) - an
advanced composite content classification engine embedded in Websense solutions - the
ThreatSeeker Network provides Websense with unparalleled visibility into the state of
content on the Internet and in email.
Equally, Symantec Corporation has also established some of the most comprehensive sources of
Internet threat data in the world with the Symantec TM Global Intelligence Network with more
than 240,000 sensors located in over 200 countries and territories monitoring attack activity
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSightTM Threat
Management System, SymantecTM Managed Security Services, NortonTM consumer products,
and third-party data sources.
The Symantec systems gathers malicious code intelligence (including Spam and phishing data)
from more than 133 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed its antivirus
products. Also, the Symantec distributed honeypot network collects data from around the globe,
capturing previously unseen threats and attacks and providing valuable insight into attack
methods.
The other private sector organizations have similar setups that collect billions of data, analyze
them and produce daily, quarterly, yearly and other periodic reports.
At the US government level, the Department of Homeland Security has established a national
monitoring system called the "Einstein Project" that tracks and analysis Internet traffic from
several locations around the country (and possibly around the world). In principle, the
technology and mode of operation is similar to those of commercially developed IDPs.
Statistical data collected and analyzed by the different organizations clearly demonstrate a rising
trend in Cyber attacks with increasing sophiscatedness. In terms of reporting, each organization
presents the results of its monitoring activities in different forms of published editions: research
report, periodical, etc. For example, Symantec Corporation publishes quarterly and half-year
reports.
The following are the highlights of some statistical report we have selected to analyze.
1. A taxonomy and comparison of computer security incidents from the commercial and
government sectors [231 (Kjaerland (2005, 2006)
A recent study published in the Computers & Security Journal 23 analyzed 2755 Cyber attack
incidents and provided the frequency analysis of some Cyber attack threat vectors. The software
package LIFA (Liverpool interactive facet analysis) together with the statistical program SPSS
was used to analyze the data. LIFA is a program that is used in criminal profiling while the
SPSS is used for the conduction of the descriptive statistics.
In the study, Kjaerland was notable for adding a quantitative component to the classification of network
attacks. In particular, her work sought not only to classify the attacks, but also to determine which factors
were most likely to co-occur in an attack. Her analysis was based on a sample of 2,755 reported incidents
to CERT/CC, from the years 2000-2002. She classified the incidents based on four categories:
* source sectors (com, gov, edu, intl, user, unknown)
* method of operation (misuse of resources, user/root compromise, social engineering, virus, web
compromise, trojan, worm, denial of service)
e impact (disrupt, distort, destruct, disclosure, unknown)
* target services (com, gov)
After categorizing each of the reported incidents along these dimensions, she performed a smallest space
analysis (SSA) to determine which of these factors were most likely to happen together. Her results
showed, among other things, that "individual user" and "web compromise" were likely to occur together;
conversely, "educational source" and "trojan" were not likely to co-occur. Although this analysis did not
determine the causality of these incidents, this sort of correlative study is very useful in understanding the
characteristics of the threat space.
The data input for the analysis consists of 1397 of the 2755 incidents in the excel binary data file
where every incident is either present or absent on each variable given in Table 4. Every incident
has a presence of one variable within each facet also given in the Table and the variables within
each facet exclusively and exhaustively account for the aspects of reported cyber incidents.
23 Kjaerland, M. (2006): "A taxonomy and comparison of computer security incidents from the commercial and
government sectors," Computers & Security, Volume 25, Issue 7, October 2006, Pages 522-538.
Table 4: Frequencies and percentages of the variables in the Smallest Space Analysis from Kjaerland M. (2006).
Facets
Impact
Method of
operation (MO)
Source sectors
Target sectors
Variables
Disrupt
Distort
Destruct
Disclosure
Unknown
Misuse of
Resources
User Compromise
Root Compromise
Social Engineering
Virus
Web Compromise
Trojan
Worm
IRecon
Denial of Service
Corn
Gov
Edu
intl
User
Unknown
Com
Gov
Identification
name SSA
Disrupt
Distort
Destruct
Disclosure
UnImpact
Misuse
UserComp
Root
SocEng
Virus
WecComnp
Trojan
iWorm.
Reconn
DoS
IScorn
Sgov
Sintel
ISuser
Sunknown
|Corn
Gov
Identification
number SSA
The 2-dimensional solution of the geographical solution is represented beneath (see Fig. 15) for
the SSA plot and Table 4 for the descriptions of the variables). For clarity it should be mentioned
that each point is a variable describing aspects of cyber intrusions. The numbers refer
to the variables as listed in Table 4, although a brief title for the variable has also been placed on
the plot to ease interpretation. The squares on the plot indicate either 'Com' or 'Gov' 'Target
Sectors'. The circles indicate 'Impact', the diamonds indicate 'Source Sectors', and the triangles
indicate 'Method of Operation'. The points 'Suser' (Individual User) and 'Web-
Comp' (Web Compromise) are placed close together on the plot, indicating that they often co-
occur in cyber incident offences. The points 'Sedu' (Educational Source) and 'Trojan' are on the
contrary placed far from each other, indicating that they do not often co-occur in the cyber
incidents analyzed.
With regards to the 'Target Sectors' that are being compared to each other, 'Com' is represented
in 838 (60%) of the incidents, and 'Gov' in 559 (40%) of the incidents. Further, with regards to
the 'Impact' of the cyber intrusions towards 'Com' and 'Gov', the most common effect was
Frequencies Sum
98.340.8
38.0
4.3
14.2
1.0
570
531
60
199
14
73
85
433
7
299
143
10
41
156
110
121
21
13
192
108
890
838
559
5.2 97.1
6.1
31
0.5
21.4
10.2
0.7
2.9
11.2
7.9
8.7 96.2
1.5
0.9
13.7
7.7
63.7
60.0 100
40.0
'Disrupt' which is occurring in 570 of 1397 incidents (40.8%). 'Distort' is occurring in 531 of
1397 incidents (38.0%). 'Disrupt' is the least invasive nature of attack, and 'Distort' is more
severe. 'Disrupt' means access change and that the organization is unable to access information
systems.
The smallest space analysis (SSA) plot is shown with frequencies in Figure 15 is divided into
three regions, with the outer region representing variables that have less than 5.2% occurrence:
e 'Trojan' (0.7%),
e 'SocEng' (Social Engineering) (0.5%),
e 'Worm' (2.9%),
e 'Sgov' (Government Source) (1.5%),
e 'UnImpact' (Unknown Impact) (1.0%), and
e 'Sedu' (Educational Source) (0.9%).
Figure 15: SSA showing the percentage ranges of the co-occurring variables from Kjaerland M. (2006).
The variables in the region of 6.1-14.2% (8-31%) are:
'WebComp' (Web Compromise) (10.2%),
'Suser' (User Source) (7.7%),
'sintel' (International Source) (13.7%),
'Disclosure' (14.2%),
'User Comp' (User Compromise) (6.1%),
'Reconn' (Recon) (11.2%),
'Scom' (Commercial Source) (8.7%), and
'DoS' (Denial of Service) (7.9%).
Finally, the variables within the inner circle of 21.4-63.7% (31-62%) are:
e 'Distort' (38.0%),
e 'Gov' (Government Target) (40.0%),
e 'Sunknown' (Unknown Source) (63.7%),
e 'Com' (Commercial Target) (60%),
e 'Virus' (21.4%),
e 'Root' (31%), and
e 'Disrupt' (40.8%).
The study further partitioned the variables in relation to what aspects of cyber intrusions are most
commonly occurring in commercial versus government reported computer security incidents (see
Figure 16).
The area defined as 'Commercial Sector' contains the variables 'Sunknown' (Unknown
Source), 'Com' (Commercial Target), 'Disrupt', 'Root', 'DoS' (Denial of Service), 'Scom'
(Commercial Source), and 'Virus'.
The area defined as 'Governmental Sector' contains the variables 'Web-Comp' (Web
Compromise), 'Suser' (User Source), 'Distort', 'Gov' (Governmental Target), 'sintel'
(International Source), 'Disclosure', 'UserComp' (User Compromise) and 'Reconn' (Recon).
Figure 16: SSA showing partitioning between the targets Com and Gov in relation to impact, method of
operation, and source sector from Kjaerland M (2006).
Also, the study presented (Table 4) the frequencies and percentages of the variables in the SSA
and provides a pointer on which "Target Sector" the attacks are directed with 838 or 60% of the
attacks or 60% directed towards the 'Corn' Sector and 559 or 40% of the incidents directed
towards the 'Gov' Sector. It also quantified the attack types. For example, the DoS accounts for
1 10 of the frequencies or 7.9% of the attacks. This is reflected in Figure 19 where the 'DoS' is
generally not far inside the circle in the 2-dimensional-plot either, and the cross-tabulations show
that 'DoS' is more common in attacks towards the 'Commercial Sector'.
2. Symantec Intelligence Quarterly, April - June 2010 [24]
The following highlights from the Symantec Intelligence Quarterly, April - June 2010 24and
presents emerging statistical trends of attacks resulting from known Internet system
vulnerabilities:
* The United States was the top country for malicious activity in this quarter, accounting
for 21 percent of the total;
* The top Web-based attack for the quarter was related to malicious PDF activity, which
accounted for 36 percent of the total;
* Credit card information was the most commonly advertised item for sale on underground
economy servers known to Symantec in this quarter, accounting for 28 percent of all
goods and services;
" Symantec created 457,641 new malicious code signatures during this quarter;
* The most common malicious code sample by potential infections during this quarter was
the Sality.AE virus;
* Symantec observed 12.7 trillion spam messages during this quarter, accounting for
approximately 89 percent of all email messages observed;
* The majority of brands used in phishing attacks this quarter were in the financial sector,
which accounted for 73 percent of the total.
Malicious activities observed during the period are ranked by country/region of in Table5. The
United States was the top ranked country for malicious activity, accounting for 21 percent of the
total. Also, within specific category measurements, the United States ranked first in all categories
except spam zombies.
India had the second highest amount of overall worldwide malicious activity this quarter,
accounting for six percent. Within specific category measurements, India ranked first in spam
zombies by a significantly large margin.
24 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other resources/b-symc intelligence quarterly apr-
jun 2010 21072009.en-us.pdf. Last checked February 19, 2011.
Table 5: Malicious activity by country/region [24].
1 United States 21% 1 5 1 1 1
2 India 6% 2 1 20 20 9
3 Germany 6% 21 4 2 2 7
4 China 5% 3 35 8 6 2
5 Brazi 5% 5 2 10 5 5
6 Italy 4% 15 8 13 4 6
7 United Kingdom 4% 10 9 3 8 3
8 Taiwan 3% 22 13 14 3 10
9 Russia 3% 12 7 7 15 4
10 France 3% 19 18 6 11 8
Table 6 assesses the top distinct Web-based attacks that originate either from compromised
legitimate sites or malicious sites that have been created to intentionally target Web users.
Table 6: Top Web-based attacks [24].
1 PDF Suspicious File Download 36%
2 Microsoft* Internet Explorer* ADODB.Stream Object File Installation Weakness 33%
3 C6 Messenger ActiveX File Overwrite 7%
4 Microsoft Internet Explorer DHTML CreateControl Range Code Executable 5%
5 Adobe* SWF Remote Code Execution 5%
6 Embed Tag NPDSPlay DLL Buffer Overflow 3%
7 Microsoft Internet Explorer WPAD Spoofing 2%
8 Microsoft Internet Explorer Popup Window Address Bar Spoofing Weakness 1%
9 Microsoft Internet Explorer CreateTextRange Remote Code Execution 1%
10 Microsoft Internet Explorer Malformed IFRAME/EMBED Buffer Overflow 1%
The most common malicious code sample by potential infections during the period was the
Sality.AE virus (Table 7). This virus infects executable files on compromised computers and
removes security applications and services. Once the virus is installed, it also attempts to
download and install additional threats onto infected computers.
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Table 7: Top malicious code samples [24].
Sality.AE
Mabezat.B
Downadup.B
Virus, worm
Worm, virus
Worm
Executables
SMTP, CIFS, removable drives
Direct network connections,
CIFS
Removes security applications and services, downloads and
installs additional threats
Encrypts and infects files
Disables security applications and Windows Update, down-
loads and installs additional threats
4 Virut.CF Virus Executables Infects files, downloads and installs additional threats
5 SillyFDC Worm Mapped, removable drives Downloads and installs additional threats
6 Almanahe Worm, virus CIFS, mapped and removable Infects executable files, ends security related processes and
drives installs additional threats
7 Gammima.AG Worm, virus Removable drives Steals online game account credentials
8 FakeAV Trojan N/A Displays false security alerts and lowers security settings
9 Gampass Trojan N/A Steals online game account credentials
Chir.B@mm Virus, worm SMTP Infects executable and HTML files
In terms of the top phishing sectors, the majority of brands used in phishing attacks for the period
were in the financial services sector (Table 8) accounting for 73 percent of the total reported
phishing attacks. The financial sector is commonly the largest sector targeted in phishing attacks
because the various associated services are the most likely to yield data that could be directly
used for financial gain.
It is noteworthy that many phishing attacks that spoof financial services brands will prompt users
to enter credit card information or banking credentials into fraudulent sites. If these tactics are
successful, the phishers can then capture and sell such information in the underground economy.
Table 8: Top phishing sectors [24].
Financial 73%
2 ISP 10%
3 Retail 5%
4 Insurance 3%
5 Internet community 2%
6 Government 2%
7 Telecom 2%
8 Computer hardware 2%
9 Online gaming <1%
10 Computer consulting <1%
1
2
3
3. Secunia's second-half year report for 2010 [25]
In Secunia's second-half year report for 2010 25, there were six (6) most prevalent impact
classes since 2005:
System access
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
Exposure of sensitive information
Manipulation of data
DoS ,and
Security bypass
Of all, "System access" had the most impact with an average of 33% while Denial of Service
attacks (DoS) declined from 14.5% to 13% in 2010.
4. Shadowserver Foundation [26]
A historical report by the Shadowserver Foundation 26 that gathers intelligence on internet-based
attacks provides an extensive detail on the magnitude, scope and origins of Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks (Table 9) over approximately a two and half (2.5) year (2006 - 2008)
span.
Table 9: Statistics of DDoS Attacks [26].
i otal
DDoS
attack last
updated
December
4, 2008
'/ I U 6.4 )9891 4483
2008 562 300 62 193051 19835 1718 112
DDoS
Attacks
last
updated
December
4, 2008
2007 848 390 67 35566 15755 1633 107
DDoS
Attacks
2006 414 215 40 50650 25953 3076 133
DDoS
Attacks
25 http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia Half Year Report 2010.pdf
26 http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Stats/DDoSHistorical
The legends used in the columns in Table 9 are explained as follows:
- CCCount - How many unique Command and Controls conducted DDoS attacks
. CCASN - How many Unique ASN's did the Command and Control servers reside in that
participated in DDoS attacks
. CCCountry - How many unique countries did the Command and Control servers reside in
that participated in DDoS attacks
. DDoSCount - How many DDoS attacks occurred during that period
. TargetCount - How many different targets were DDoS'ed
. TargetASN - How many unique ASN's were affected by the DDoS's
. TargetCountry - How many unique countries were affected by the DDoS's
The attacks and their paths are shown in the maps below in Figures 17 -20.
The pattern and trends of Cyber attacks are similar for those other organizations whose data and
statistics are not presented here.
The classification and definitions of Cyber attack types is given in the General Accounting
Office of the United States government report2 7 in Appendix 2.
Figure 17: Map of the 2007 DDoS Worldwide Attacks [26].
27 Source: GAO analysis of data from GAO and industry reports ((GAO-08-588)
httD://www.securinaourecitv.or/blop/divin2-deeoer/cvber-attack-tvoes/
Figure 18: Map of the 2007 DDoS Attacks without Paths [26].
Figure 19: Map of the 2006 DDoS Worldwide Attacks [26].
Figure 20: Map of 2006 DDoS Attacks without Paths [26].
4.3 Correlating Cyber Attack Statistical Data to Internet Vulnerabilities
Based on the statistical data presented in Section 4.2 and information from other literature
sources, we map each Cyber attack type to the specific Internet layered architecture that serves as
the conduit pipe for launching the attacks. The mapping provides a clearer picture and
understanding on where additional Cyber security work should be concentrated on and forms
part of the derived implications discussed in Chapter 5.
Figure 21 presents a mapping of Cyber attack types to specific Internet (TCP/IP reference model)
layer. The attack types are populated on the header columns and the Internet layers populated on
the header rows of the grid (with their functions and the TCP/IP weaknesses briefly explained).
The "Xs" represents a match i.e. an intersection point between the columns and rows where a
particular Cyber attack type occur on the Internet layer.
Overall, the IP layer is the layer where most Cyber attacks take place followed by the
Application layer. The least impervious to the attacks is the Physical/hardware layer.
Also, the lack of authentication mechanism on the Internet system is the greatest factor that
makes the system vulnerable to all attack types. In the grid, this is represented as a "Non
TCP/IP" layer.
TCP/IP Reference Model
IP directs packets to a
Internet Protocol specific computer using
L ayer an IP address.
Non TCP/IP
Security Engineering
Architecture
Legend
ND - Not Determined
Figure 21: Mapping of Cyber Attacks to Their Sources of Origin on the Internet Layered Architecture
from Iheagwara C. (2011).28
28 Iheagwara, C. 2010, "Cyber Attacks -Internet Architecture Mapping," S.M. Thesis, MIT, 2010.
Based on the above mapping, the data and discussion presented in Section 4.2, we discern the
following Cyber attack trends:
1. Most Cyber attacks originate from the vulnerabilities created in the IP layer of the
TCP/IP protocol stack.
2. The lack of authentication mechanism can result to any type and number of Cyber
attacks.
3. For the most part, all reports indicate that the level of total cyber attack activity has been
steadily increasing. The reports also found that damage caused by recent blended threats,
such as SPAM, phishing, and Opaserv, was considerably higher than that caused by old
threats, such as Code Red. Mixed with the encouraging news at least for the noticeable
decrease in old threats, the different sources also documented hundreds of new
vulnerabilities in 2010, an increase of more than 21.5 percent over 2009. For all, it is
widely believed that the possibility of future, high impact, blended threats continues to
represent one of the greatest risks to the Internet community.
4. In terms of Cyber attacks resulting from Internet design flaws, DoS and DDoS are the
most devastating and constitute between 7.9 (CSI/FBI report to 14% (Secunia report) of
all Cyber attacks. Although, the DoS and DDoS attacks are smaller in number when
compared with Phishing and SPAM attacks, their impact is more devastating as often the
targets are companies who often are forced to shut down business activities for some time
leading to significant economic loss. And, as Internet usage grows, DDoS and DoS based
attacks grows.
5. The lethal Dos and DDoS are attackers exploit the weaknesses at the Internet Protocol
layer and results in the most financial losses of all Cyber attacks.
6. Phishing, Spaming, Viruses and Worms are related to Application layer weaknesses that
are introduced by software applications.
7. Power and Energy companies show the highest rate of both attack activity and severe
event incidence. In addition, the Financial Services sector experienced an elevation in
overall attack volume and severe event incidence.
8. Blended threats, continued to constitute the most frequently reported threat. Blended
threats combine the characteristics of viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious code
with server and Internet vulnerabilities to initiate, transmit, and spread an attack. For
example, eighty percent of all malicious code submissions were caused by only three
blended threats: Klez, Opaserv, and Bugbear. Further, 78 percent of all cyber attack
activity detected by Symantec was related to both old and recent blended threats.
4.4 Summary
In this Chapter, we reviewed and analyzed several Internet traffic monitoring reports and
statistical research studies on Cyber attacks.
From the analysis, we deduced several facts which together with interpretations of the domain
issues, inferences and the statistical data presented in the previous Chapters aided development
of the grid presented as Figure 21 that maps each Cyber attack type to specific Internet
architecture layers.
On the quantification of each Cyber attack type as a percentage of the overall Cyber attacks, we
conclude that quantification is difficult to realize because of insufficient and scanty data from
which such quantification could be derived; and the lack of any known predictive (or adaptive)
model that can help us to accomplish this.
From our analysis, we discerned several well-known trends in the constantly evolving
Cyberspace world. Primarily, most Cyber attacks occur at the TCP/IP layer with the physical
(link) layer being the least affected. And most certainly, the lack of an authentication platform on
system gives rise to all Cyber attack types.
Chapter 5: Stakeholder Analysis
In this Chapter, we conduct stakeholder and beneficiary analysis to better understand and
conceptualize the Internet system design intent, goals and processes.
We create a statement of the goals (the system problem statement) at the highest level (i.e.
without any decomposition to goals associated with the first level of decomposition of process or
form); and comment on the "goals map to the system" and the "needs to goals framework."
We discuss the operand and value related solution neutral transformation, solution neutral
function, furction and form to delineate the security requirements explicit and implicit in the
process. We interpret the needs of the beneficiary as goals to be satisfied by the stakeholder
design and answer the "value questions" for a beneficiary and a stakeholder.
Based on critical characteristics of the system, we devise a conceptual typology of system.
Further, we identify the key stakeholders and beneficiaries in the process and describe the roles
played by them in addressing the problem of security.
5.1 Introduction
One of the important functions of a system architect is reducing ambiguity of the system being
designed. Crawley E. (2010)29 provides a contextual basis on how to proceed and realize this
and asserts:
" The principal way to reduce ambiguity is to set clear goals for the system (also called
requirements, specs, etc.)
* Ambiguity is reduced when we set goals that are:
o Representative
o Complete and consistent
o Humanly understandable
o Consistent with resources
While reducing ambiguity is a design goal, nonetheless, Crawley E. (2010) asserts "We will
never succeed in eliminating ambiguity - there will be unresolved issues at any time, and the
future will continue to introduce more ambiguity."
Relating this to the Internet system design, we will set out to analyze the architecture of the
current Internet system to understand if there ambiguity in stakeholder design intent as it relates
to the security mandates for the solution neutral statement and value related operand of system
for safe (secure) connection and transmission.
29 Crawley, E. (20 10)"Identifying Value - Reducing Ambiguity in the System," Lecture Notes on System
Architecture, October 8, 2010, MIT.
In accordance with the "Framework - Needs to Goals Approach" proposed by Crawley E.
(2010), we will:
* Identify primary, and other beneficial stakeholders, and their needs
* Characterize their needs, prioritized by the benefit to the stakeholder and importance in
supply
* Interpret the needs as goals, and mapping on to the project
e Prioritize the goals based on the integrated stakeholder needs, and create metrics
e Validate that the system meets the design intents to satisfy needs of the beneficiaries and
the goals of stakeholders
5.2 Stakeholder Analysis as a Framework
As described in Chapter 2, the Internet system is an assembly of several components and
subsystems from different entities that collaborate to fuel, enhance and sustain the system with a
mutually assured responsibility for the security of the system. The degree to which each is
responsible for the security of the system is a subject of this stakeholder analysis
Stakeholder analysis has become an established framework used to identify and examine the
interactions between organizations and constituents in external environment. It was originally
advocated by Freeman R. (1984)30 as a tool for managers to proactively engage their external
environment in the face of a rapidly changing global marketplace. Ever since then, it has been
applied to different uses such as need-based analysis, justifications, impetus to launch a new
project, etc. Although, in general, the term 'stakeholder' refers to individuals, groups or
organizations that need to be taken into account by leaders and managers contemplating any
action on an issue. While earlier researchers confined stakeholders to a firm based on their
organizational membership, subsequent scholars have recognized the existence of stakeholders
outside of firm boundaries. Mitchell et al (1997)31 suggested a framework for stakeholder
identification based on three criteria namely power, legitimacy and urgency. Stakeholder
analysis has been widely applied in strategic management, corporate governance (Burgoyne et al.
(1994)32; Donaldson et al. (1995)33) as well in information systems studies.
The activities and the five steps in establishing the framework for a stakeholder analysis is given
in Figure 22.
30 Freeman R. E. (1984), Strategic Management: A Stakeholder approach, Boston: Pitman.
31 Mitchell, R, Agle, B & Wood, D (1997). Towards a theory of stakeholder identification: Defining
the principle of who & what really counts, Academy of Management Review 22(4): 853-886.
32 Burgoyne, John G., Stakeholder analysis, in Cassel. C. and G. Symon (ed.), Qualitative Methods
in Organizational Research: a practical guide, Sage, New Delhi, pp. 187-207, 1994
33 Donaldson T. and Preston L. E. (1995), The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts,
Evidence, and Implications, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 65-91.
Expanded Framework - Needs to Goals Approach
Figure 22: Expanded Framework for Stakeholder Analysis from Crawley E. (2010).
Using the expanded framework, we conduct the following Internet system stakeholder analysis.
5.3 Internet System Goals and Stakeholder Intent
Given that the primary goal of the Internet design is to establish Internet connection for a
community of users who wishes to transact or communicate over the medium, there is an implied
mandate for such transactions and communications to be accomplished inexpensively and safely
in such manner that the integrity and timely delivery of the packets being transmitted is
guaranteed. Figures 24 and 25 maps the problem statement and goals to the Internet system
design and makes it obvious that meeting the design goal is integral to satisfying Internet
security requirements.
In general, there are so many elements and factors that need to be considered when formulating
system architectural goals and intents. Crawley E. (2010) discerns (in Figure 23) the following
among the many elements to be considered when designing a system:
* Business Case - (reflecting customer needs, competitive environment, strategy, channels,
etc.)
* System Architecture (Benefit) - (reflecting regulation, technology, competent supply
chain, legacy elements, etc.)
e Platforms (bordering on System Architecture)
e Product lines (bordering on Business Case)
Insight
77 Customer
Regulation Technology Needs CompetitiveStandards / A \ .
:7Products (value to customer)
Profits (value to share holder)
Figure 23: Driving a System Goal Factors from Crawley E. (2010).
For the Internet system, all of the above elements are integral to defining the goals of the system.
For example, the business case is the necessity to interconnect networks and users, the system
architecture must be complaint with regulations using different technologies that are platform
independent such that the different software applications and product lines can seamlessly fuse
into the Internet system. This means that the Internet system is built on the concept that the
system is platform independent to satisfy a variety of business cases and user needs and the
different product lines that fuses into it.
A statement of goal by system problem statement
We provide the following Internet system problem statement: The goal of the Internet is to
establish Internet connection in order to transmit messages or communicate inexpensively and
safely from the Sender to the Recipient in such manner that guarantees the confidentiality,
integrity and timely delivery of the packets being transmitted or the message being delivered.
34 Iheagwara, C, HoonYoo, J and Prurapark, R. A (2010): "Internet System Stakeholder Analysis" Systems
Architecture (ESD.34) class project, MIT, Fall, 2010.
Figure 24: Internet System Problem Statement Mapping from Iheagwara C. et al. (2010).
Impliedly, the design goal of the Internet system is to design an inter-networking collaboration
system that enables organizations, communities and users to connect so as to be able to
communicate, exchange data/information and transact business.
This goal is clearly expressed in the solution neutral function, function, and form of the system
given in Figure 25.
Form
Figure 25: Mapping Goals to System from Iheagwara C. et al. (2010).
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Function
Function
In a general sense, when faced with competing goals, some will assume greater importance and
hence the need to prioritize the subsidiary goals into critical, important, etc. Followed by the
development of appropriate metrics that would go with each of the subsidiary or expanded goals.
And, prioritization entails drawing up descriptive goals.
For the Internet system, the descriptive goals can be characterized into three (3) categories:
" Critically
> The Internet connectivity must be constantly available
> Connections and transmissions must be secure
> Must guarantee delivery of messages or communication
> Must ensure the non repudiation of transmitted messages or communication
> Must be platform independent
> Must be interoperable with different networking technologies
* Importantly
> Shall provide enough bandwidth to ensure Quality of Service (QoS) to guarantee
user satisfaction
> Must be flexible enough for re-architecting
" Desirably
> Shall be affordable
> Be adaptive to different usage technologies (in terms of applications and devices
that can be coupled into it)
From here we derive one of the most important priorities which expresses that Internet
"Connections and transmissions must be secure."
One of the post-design and in-operation goals is concrete proof that the design intent and goals
are met. Often, metrics are used in the tests to verify and validate this.
On meeting the goals, Crawley E. (2010) expresses:
* If the goals are met - the product/system is a "success" (in principle)
* Only if the goals answer a real need (in context of competition, regulation,
macroeconomic environment, etc.) will a product/system be a success in reality
e Goals are tradable surrogates for success
e Therefore, a representative goal is one that ensures that value will be delivered to meet
need, within a competitive environment, regulation, etc. Metrics flow from goals and help
"ensure" success
For the Internet system, a representative goal includes secure connection and transmission and
meeting this goal is not only a measure of success for the system but also has implication for the
stakeholder intents and the beneficiary needs.
Testing the goals entails validating that the goals are met, and if not that the needs of the
stakeholders will be addressed.
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Figure 26: Framework to test a goal from Crawley E. (2010)
Going by the test model in Figure 26, Crawley E. (2010) notes:
> Completeness is usually clarified by the time functional description is made
> Consistency is usually clarified after concept, and models are created
> Attainability is usually clarified only after models simulate all goal metrics and their
delivered value
For the Internet system, completeness, consistency and attainability have been tested by
validation via different empirical metrics. The identification of a single goal set is not
representative of true success since even today the Internet already has proven itself as one of the
best ways for communication, attainable within resources & technology. It has not at the same
time satisfied the goal of securing the system and compounds the fact that consistent and
complete goals are vital to resolve ambiguity and creating the path for product success. And, the
manifestation of hugely immense Cyber attacks is a clear indication of the failure of one of the
design intent and goal.
We have established that the solution neutral function (Figure 25) of inexpensively and safely
transmitting over the Internet is an implied mandate of intent to design a system that securely
connects and transmits over the Internet. As this Internet stakeholder analysis reveals in Section
5.6, there are several key players with primarily responsibilities to implement security on the
system. And, one way or the other, they stakes are affected by the Cyber security posture of the
design and management of the Internet system.
In the end, the test of a good Internet system design lies in the question of "what responsibilities
does stakeholders have when it comes to securing the value related processes over the Internet?"
5.4 Value Related Internal Processes and Operands
Figure 27 is an idealized graphical representation of the Internet system process and the key
devices that form parts of the infrastructure. The value related instrument objects are the devices
used to execute the value related internal processes where the value related operand is the
Analog to Digital (A/D) converter, the value related attribute includes Speed, Safety (security),
Size of the content, Latency and Throughput, the solution neutral statement (see Figure 25) of
the value related transformation is the transmitting information, and other important
attributes of operand and transformation include Speed of transmission, QoS (Quality of
Service), and Integrity of data packet.
The Integrity of data packet is directly related to the security of the data being transmitted as any
form of modification could mean violation of the confidentiality and actual data being
transmitted.
The routers (value related instrument objects) and in some cases the switches operate at the
Internet layer of the TCP/IP model (see Figure 27). The design and mode of operation of these
devices have implications for Cyber security.
Figure 27: Map of Internet System Processes from Iheagwara C. et al. (2010).
Figure 27 illustrates that value related instrument objects (device) makers such as Cisco Systems
that make the routers and others that builds the applications or provided the infrastructures that
are part of the Internet system have responsibilities for securing the system.
In Section 5.5, we provide a description of four categories of Internet stakeholders.
5.4 Internet Infrastructure and Service Providers
Clearly, the process centric architecture (Figure 27) shows that there are different vested
stakeholders. Going by system design, there are four primary groups of stakeholders. The
several infrastructure devices identified for the process include routers, switches and modems
that transform the data and move them f-om one location to another.
Given this, we categorize the infrastructure and service providers into four distinctive groups:
First, the category 'Internet System Architects and Designers' serves as the originator of the
Internet and includes the IAB, IETF, and IRTF. Second, at the connection end are the Internet
service providers (ISPs). Third, is a group of Internet infrastructure providers. This category
includes:
(i) internetworking device providers like Cisco Systems who typically provide connection
equipments (routers that operate at the Internetwork layer of the TCP/IP) that directly
or indirectly control, manage and co-ordinate the transaction process for their
customers, and
(ii) direct manufacturers of Internet hardware like backbone Servers and services. Fourth, the
final group consists of Internet application and hardware developers that develop the
applications that runs on the Internet and manufactures the hardware that hosts the
applications.
Internet System Architects and Designers
The IAB (Internet Architecture Board) - the Internet Society is the overseer of the technical
evolution of the Internet; and supervises the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which is
tasked with overseeing the evolution of TCP/IP, and the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
which works on network technology, defines the Internet Architecture as "a meta-network, a
constantly changing collection of thousands of individual networks intercommunicating with a
common protocol."
Internet Service Providers (ISPs):
An important stakeholder in the Internet system process is the ISP, who provides the
fundamental internet access services to both senders as well as recipients. Internet Service
Providers have become a critical component of the commercial Internet providing customers
Internet access, web hosting services, e-commerce technologies, and email access. According to
the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, ISPs are 'mere conduits' and as a
result are not liable for the content of information they transmit through their networks. There is
a general argument that ISPs need to be the first line of defense in combating Cyber attacks. For
example, the Internet Engineering Task Force's (IETF) Network Working Group has developed
protocol standards (RFC 2871) and best practices (RFCs 2505 and 2635) for ISPs to follow in
order to help reduce spam. These standards require ISPs to prevent their mail servers from being
used by unauthorized third parties to relay e-mails and to provide sufficient information in e-mail
headers to make it possible to verify the source of e-mail.
Internet Infrastructure Providers
This group is engaged in the business of providing connection equipment like routers and
switches that work at the Internet layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack. Often called the Internet
plumber, Cisco Systems is the dominant player here. They maintain customer contact databases
and engage in commercial communication on behalf of other merchants and marketers. The
growth of the Internet has been attributed to the several technologies and enabling infrastructures
developed by this group.
Internet Application Developers and Hardware Providers
This group includes those who develop the software applications and hardware devices that are
used directly by online customers and system integrators who provide software coupling and
system integration services. Hewlett Packard, IBM, Microsoft Corporation, Oracle Corporation
and a host of other companies belong to this group.
Figure 28 shows is a composite ecosystem of the Internet Infrastructure integrating different
ISPs, Domain Systems, Applications, etc.
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Figure 28: Typical Internet System Infrastructure.
In the next Section we conduct a Stakeholder Beneficiary Analysis to discern the stakes and
needs of the current Internet system.
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5.5 Internet Stakeholder Beneficiary Analysis
Needs is common to both the stakeholder and beneficiary in the Internet system. For the
Beneficiaries, the Internet output is their needs, and the Stakeholders in return generate
revenues and other needs from the beneficiaries. There is, therefore, mutual interdependence as
both have an outcome or output which addresses each other's needs that must be considered.
In Tables 10 and 11 below we present the stakeholders analysis. Two major types of
beneficiaries are illustrated in Table 10:
" Direct beneficiary - the primary beneficiary is anyone who sends or receives information
or communicates using the Internet. The benefit that flows to them is the
message/information/data that is transmitted including emails, downloads, etc. In other
words the communication that flows through the system. Equally, the ability to have
instant access to a wide variety of information/data on the Internet is an accruable benefit.
" Indirect beneficiary - the indirect benefits are those derived from the enabling utilities
of the Internet such as e-Commerce. As a result of the Internet and its enabling
infrastructures, many companies now conduct business on the Internet. Examples are
eBay and Amazon. Also, almost all companies now have Web sites that describe their
business. These would not have been possible without the Internet.
Table 10: Internet System Stakeholders and Beneficiaries [34].
Stakeholder Itre
(Those who have a stake Otu/ucm Toewobnft (hs h eei
in the Internet services; drcl rmItre nietyfo
and have an outcome or Otu)Itre upt
output which addresses
beneficiary's needs that
are important.)
Internet Service Provider
(ISP) - Qwest
Communications
Internet connection Connecting Entities i.e.
corporations
Regulator (FCC);
Internetworking Vendors
i.e. CISCO, NOKIA,
AVAYA, etc.
Verizon Communications Telecommunications (i.e. Subscribers, customers, etc. Regulator (FCC);
Telephony service) Internetworking Vendors
i.e. CISCO, NOKIA,
AVAYA, etc.
Web Hosting Provider - Messaging i.e. email Corporate users i.e. email Regulator (FCC):
Ipage Users: eMessaging Software
* Employees Vendors i.e. Microsoft (for
* Contractors Outlook;
* Business Partners Internetworking Vendors
i.e. CISCO, NOKIA,
AVAYA, etc.
Budget Conferencing, Teleconference/Telemeeting Corporate users i.e. email Regulator (FCC):
Skype Users: Collaboration Software
* Employees Vendors;
SContractors Internetworking Vendors
e Business Partners i.e. CISCO, NOKIA,
AVAYA, etc.
Facebook, Linkedin, etc Social Networking All subscribing Internet Users Regulator (FCC); Social
including corporate Networking Software
employees Vendors i.e. phpFox;
Internetworking Vendors
i.e. CISCO, NOKIA,
AVAYA, etc.
eBay, Amazon, etc Online Marketing Consumers Regulator (FCC);
Auctioneers; Publishers
Media organizations, e.g. News& Information General Public Regulator (FCC); Cable
CNN Technology vendors
Media organizations, Online Entertainment Consumers Regulator (FCC); Artists,
Walt Disney Comic, Film Makers, etc.
Colleges Educational Services Students US Dept of Ed; Teachers,
(Distance Learning) Publishers, Book stores,
etc.
Citibank, BOA, etc Online banking & financial Clients/Customers FDIC
services
Etc. Etc. Etc. Etc.
Notes: Given the complexity of the Internet system, the growing needs, uses, technologies and
others that have converged on it, Table 10 is only a partial listing of the stakeholders and
beneficiaries as they are still and constantly evolving.
Table 11 presents stakeholder and beneficiaries needs.
Table 11: Internet System Stakeholder -Beneficiary Needs Analysis [34].
Internet Service
Provider (ISP) -
Qwest
Communications
Verizon
Communications
Customers Revenue
(Stream)
Providing Constant
and high-quality
Service
Verizon Telecommunications
Communications Customers
Revenue (Stream)
Providing
Constant and high-
quality Service
Web Hosting Website hosting
Provider - Ipage
Customers
Revenue (Stream)
Providing
Constant and high-
quality Service
internet
Connection
Uninterrupted
service
internet service
subscribing or
connecting entities i.e.
Unatek, Inc.
Telephone Subscribers,
services (tele, fax, customers, etc.
cell, etc.)
Affordable Plan
High-Quality
Service
eMail services Corporate users:
Low cost Employees
Contractors
Constant Business Partners
Availability
High-quality
Video
conferencing
Teleconferencing
Corporate users
Students
Teachers
Need Indirect Beneficiary
Stakeholder
Stakeholder Need
Acceptable Internet
usage
Protection of society
Regulator (FCC):
Video/Telecon
Budget
Conferencing,
Skype
Internet Video
Streaming
Teleconferecing
Acceptable Internet Regulator (FCC);
usage
Internetworking
Protection of society Vendors i.e. CISCO,
from Internet abuse NOKIA, AVAYA, etc.
and predatorial
activities
Customers
Revenue
Acceptable Telecom Regulator (FCC);
usage
Internetworking
Protection of society Vendors i.e. CISCO,
from Internet abuse NOKIA, AVAYA, etc.
and predatorial
activities
Customers
Revenue
Acceptable Internet Regulator (FCC):
usage
Protection of society
from hosting abuse eMessaging Software
and predatorial Vendors i.e. Microsoft
activities (for Outlook;
Internetworking
Customers Vendors i.e. CISCO,
Revenue NOKIA, AVAYA, etc.
Customers
Revenue (Stream)
Providing
Constant and high-
quality Service
Revenue (Stream)
Facebook, Customers
Linkedln, etc
Revenue (Stream)
Providing
Constant and
high-quality
Service
eBay, Amazon, Online Marketing
etc Customers
Auctioneers
Retail Outlets
Distribution
Channels
Merchandise
Suppliers
Revenue (Stream)
Media Network
organizations, e.g. Television
CNN Viewers/consume
rs
Advertisers
Revenue (Stream)
Clients
Show promoters
Entertainers
Film makers
Social All subscribing social
Networking networking Users such
as individuals,
Messaging corporate account
Group users, social groups,
discussions etc.
Group Forum
Advertisemen
ts
Goods, Online Consumers
Merchandize
and products
of all sorts
News Viewers/consumers
Entertainment
Education Students
from telecon abuse
and predatorial
activities
Customers
Revenue
Software Vendors i.e.
Skype;
Internetworking
Vendors i.e. CISCO,
NOKIA, AVAYA, etc.
Acceptable usage of Regulator (FCC);
social networking
Social Networking
Protection of society Software Vendors i.e.
from abuse and phpFox;
predatorial activities Internetworking
Vendors i.e. CISCO,
Customers NOKIA, AVAYA, etc.
Revenue
Acceptable e- Regulator (FCC); US
Commerce usage Dept. of Commerce
Protection of society
from abuse and Auctioneers;
predatorial activitics Publishers
Prevention of online e-
Commerce scams
Customers
Revenue
Acceptable mass Regulator (FCC);
media usage
Protection of society Cable Technology
from abuse and vendors
predatorial activities
Customers
Revenue
Acceptable Internet
usage
Protection of society
from abuse and
US Dept of Ed;
Teachers, Publishers,
Book stores, etc.
Colleges Long Distance
Learning
Revenue (Stream)
Students
I I I TI IIpredatorial activities I
Citibank, BOA, Online Banking
etc Revenue
Customers
Etc. Etc.
1 Clients/Customers
Etc.
Colleges
Students
Customers
Revenue
Prevention of online FDIC
banking fraud
Protection of society
from Internet abuse
and predatorial
activities
ETC Etc.Etc.
Notes: Table 11 is only a partial listing of the still and constantly evolving needs of the Internet system stakeholders and beneficiaries.
5.6 Summary
In this Chapter, we have conducted a stakeholder-beneficiary analysis of the Internet system and
have discerned stakeholder intent and goals evident in the original design and the security
requirements mandated for the system.
Based on our analysis, we note that there is an expressed mandate for a process architecture that
includes security and that the current design leaves this out. We delineated the different value
related processes and instruments used to execute processes. Interestingly, the value related
instruments such as routers, switches and other routing devices have become part of the internet
massive infrastructure outlay and those that did not address security of the system have also
become a bane of the process.
Finally, we conclude that stakeholders have the primary responsibility of assuring security on the
system in a collaborative fashion.
Chapter 6: Strategic Implications of the Current Internet System
Architecture Flaws on Cyber Security
In the preceding Chapters we explored Cyber security from several viewpoints and provided a
description of Cyberspace, analyzed the Internet architecture and its inherent weaknesses that are
exploited and serves as the conduit to launch Cyber attacks. We also discussed the different types
of well-known Cyber attacks, how they are monitored and analyzed, attempted to quantify each
type as a percentage of the overall Cyber attacks and then mapped specific attack types to the
Internet architecture layer where they occur. Additionally, we conducted a stakeholder analysis
of the Internet system from a design standpoint and established that it is a design intent that
security be implemented on all connections and transmissions taking place over the Internet
medium otherwise known as Cyberspace and that all stakeholders share a responsibility in
ensuring that.
All of the above and the other issues explored and discussed in the preceding Chapters provide
the impetus, background and the basis to derive the following strategic implications of the
current Internet design for Cyber security.
6.1 Implications Number One: Unfulfilled Stakeholder Intent
In Figure 26, it is noted that one of the solution neutral functions of the Internet is to safely
transmit transactions. As an engineering statement, this embodies an expressed stakeholder
intent that requires the system to guarantee safe delivery of transactions which occur over it.
Secure or safe Internet transaction has been interpreted by different groups and people to mean
different things. As was noted by David Clark (from Iheagwara C. 2010)36, there are issues that
revolve around defining security in the context of sender-recipient. Privacy, Safety, Integrity,
Confidentiality, and even availability have been used by the different interest groups to denote
and define Internet security to suit their purpose. Hence, there is no agreement on what constitute
security and for that matter, the scope and extent that will be acceptable as adequate for Internet
transaction.
What is obvious is that secure transmission of Internet transaction embodies an essential
requirement of the design. The lack of which negates the stakeholder intent and gives rise to the
multitude of Cyber security issues.
Satisfying the stakeholder intent requires addressing the issues as there is no "silver bullet"
solution for the myriad of Cyber security issues unless stakeholders collaborate to address
security to enhance trust and confidence of users in networks, applications and services. A wide
range of questions bring the issues front and center and have far reaching implications if not
addressed.
36 Iheagwara, C. (2010), Interview with David Clark, MIT, December 14, 2010.
For example:
- With global cyberspace, what are the security priorities for the Internet
stakeholders with the government / private sector partnership and users?
- Is there a need for top-down strategic direction to complement bottom-up,
contribution-driven process?
- Can a balance be established between centralized and distributed efforts on
security standards?
" Who assume responsibility for legal and regulatory aspects of Cyber security,
spam, identity/privacy?
- Can stakeholders collaborate to address full cycle - vulnerabilities, threats and
risk analysis; prevention; detection; response and mitigation; forensics; learning
- Can they agree uniform definitions of Cyber security terms and definitions?
- Can they work towards the full integration of and acceptance of marketplace
Information Security Management System (ISMS) standards (ISO/IEC 27000-
series and ITU-T X. 1051) - the security equivalent to ISO 9000-series?
- Can an effective cooperation and collaboration across the many bodies doing
Cyber security work?
Ultimately, the lack of or inadequate cooperation among various stakeholders to address the
issues will result into inability to create the necessary security architecture and framework.
6.2 Implications Number Two: Ad-hoc Solutions and Expediencies have
become the Order of the Day (with constant patchwork and fixes)
Willinger et al. (2002) implies the original design objectives of the Internet specified a set of first
and second-level objectives - on to how to make the Internet design more effective. Quoting
from [26], these requirements are (in decreasing order of importance):
* Robustness: Internet communication must continue despite loss of networks or
gateways/routers.
" Heterogeneity (Services): The Internet must support multiple types of communications
services.
* Heterogeneity (Networks): The Internet architecture must accommodate a variety of
networks.
" Distributed Management: The Internet architecture must permit distributed management
of its resources.
* Cost: The Internet architecture must be cost effective.
" Ease of Attachment: The Internet architecture must permit host attachment with a low
level of effort.
" Accountability: The resources used in the Internet architecture must be accountable.
Further, Willinger et al. (2002) states "The intent of the two tier requirement specification was
based on the need to architect a network of networks and make for flexibility for the complex
systems that comprise the architecture. Thus, while the top-level requirement of internetworking
was mainly responsible for defining the basic structure of the common architecture shared by the
different networks that composed the "network of networks" (or "Internet" as we now know it),
this priority-ordered list of second-level requirements, first and foremost among them the
robustness criterion, has to a large degree been responsible for shaping the architectural model
and the design of the protocols (standards governing the exchange of data) that define today's
Internet. This includes the Internet's well-known "hourglass" architecture and the enormously
successful "fate-sharing" approach to its protocol design." 37
Impliedly, the design principles did not mandate "security" as a requirement and contradicts the
stakeholder's intent to transmit data or information securely. This may well account for the lack
of basic "Authentication" security requirement that provides the system the ability to
authenticate. In addition, lacking are several platforms including the platform for:
- Security architecture aspects of end users and networks in routing
- Extensible Authentication Protocol (based Authentication and Key Management) in a
Data Communication Network
- Specifying protocols and procedures that support functions of the password
Authentication security dimension (Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol
(PAK) )
- Framework for creation, storage, distribution and enforcement of policies for network
security.
These are just a few of the platforms which need to be addressed for effective security
enforcement on Cyber space.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Lack of Extensible Authentication Protocol based Authentication
and Key Management in a Data Communication Network is a big problem. The current design
did not address or specify a protocol, which would ensure mutual authentication of all parties in
the act of establishing communication and exchanges; and therefore cannot contain or abate
emerging threats as ad-hoc solutions have limitations and are no silver-bullet solutions.
All these complicates the task of securing Cyberspace and is compounded by the fact that over
the years, the originally simple communications technology have increasingly become complex;
more fragile and difficult to manage with each passing day just as Internet applications grew
both in product and service mix with wireless devices, peer-to-peer file-sharing, telephony and
others even as companies and network engineers resort - and sometimes in desperate fashions -
to coming up with ingenious and expedient patches, plugs, and workarounds.
37 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB), National Research Council. The Internet's Coming of
Age. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 2001.
In the face of this, many experts in the field are proposing rethinking the way the Internet works.
For example, Clark argues (from Talbot, 2005) that "it's time to rethink the Internet's basic
architecture, to potentially start over with a fresh design -- and equally important, with a
plausible strategy for proving the design's viability, that we somehow failed to include," says
Clark. "We need so that it stands a chance of implementation."It's not as if there is some killer
technology at the protocol or network level to take all the technologies we already know and fit
them together so that we get a different overall system. This is not about building a technology
innovation that changes the world but about architecture -- pulling the pieces together in a
different way to achieve high-level objectives."
6.3 Implications Number Three: Constantly Evolving New Threats and
Threat Vectors
Talbot (2005) asserts "Cyber-Security threats are always evolving around Internet system
weaknesses including software/hardware/link vulnerabilities; with hackers, spammers and other
forms of online criminality adapting to the changing security environment of business networks
exploiting the weaknesses. The effect is an exponential growth and overlapping deluge of cyber-
attacks on governments and companies being targeted by criminals and nation-states seeking
economic or military advantage becoming so large that those responsible for security are having
trouble identifying which new threats should take priority in their threat management regimes."
All available data and statistics on Cyber security supports Talbot's assertion and points to the
increasing magnitude and scope of the emerging new threats exploiting Internet weaknesses to
launch new forms of Cyber attacks. Figures 29, 30 and 31 accurately illustrate the trend and it is
doubtful that ad-hoc solutions are going to abate or slow the trend.
But, it is worthy to note that the exponential growth and overlapping deluge stems from the lack
of any Internet security authentication mechanism; and the emergence of Bot- network (a
collection of malicious software agents, or robots, that run autonomously and automatically)
operations is the single most important driver for this exponential growth.
ExpandingThreat Vectors Means Complexity
of the Security Enironmentis on the Rise
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Nine Sources of Emerging Cyber security Threats.
Lipson H. (2002)39 provides an excellent summary of cyber attacks over time, as reproduced in Figure 30.
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Figure 30: Sophistication of Cyber Attacks and Attackers over Time, from Lipson (2002).
38 Cyber Crime Report. http://securingourecity.org/blog/#. Last checked August 2010.
3 Lipson, H (2002), "Tracking and tracing cyber attacks: technical challenges and global policy issues." Technical
Report CMU/SEI-2002-SR-009, Carnegie Mellon University, 2002. Accessed at
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/pub/documents/02.reports/pdf/02sr009.pdf.
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In the end, the implication is that organizations and online users will increasingly continue to
devise schemes and ad-hoc solutions to deal with the new threats until the issues identified are
resolved and the Internet is given the ability to authenticate.
6.4 Implications Number Four: The Emergence of the Underground Economy
An entire underground economy has been built by Cyber criminals for the purpose of stealing,
packaging, and reselling electronic information and data. This economy consists of online black
market forums formed for the purpose of promoting and trading stolen information and services.
The infrastructure that powers the economy is a fairly extended network of well-built Servers
powered by Bot-net and other technologies and operated using remote Internet access to
corporate systems, embedded malware in computers, applications and devices and with little
visibility into the security protocols of suppliers and business units.
While the emergence of the underground economy may be considered another threat agent, its
rapid growth is a pointer to the difficulties and inability of the current Cyber security practices to
contain, slow down or eliminate the economy altogether.
Symantec Quarterly Intelligence Report (see Table 12) presents statistical data on the
Underground Economy. According to the report, the most frequently advertised items for sale
observed on underground economy servers, was credit card information, accounting for 28
percent of all goods. A host of very private and personal items such as bio-data or personal
identity data are also available.
40 State of Spyware Q2 2006. Webroot Software, Inc. (2006, June).
http://www.webroot.com/resources/stateofspyware/excerpt.html. Last checked June 17, 2010.
Table 12: Goods and services available for sale on underground economy servers [24].
1 Credit cards 28% $1 -$30
2 Bank accounts 24% $10 -$125
3 Email accounts 8% $5 -$12
4 Email addresses 5% $5 - $10 per MB
5 Credit card dumps 4% No specified prices
6 R57 & C99 shells 3% $2-$5
7 Full identity 3% $3 - $20
8 Mailers 3% $1 - $5
9 Attack toolkits 3% $5 - $20 or $120 per month
10 Cash-out services 2% $200 - 100 or 50% - 70%
While the net effect might not necessarily be the lost of material possession, the divulging of
very private and personal information to a public that has yet come to terms - but will with time
- with the negative implications that in all certainty will expand in scope in time and present
more difficulties.
The other attendant effect which will most definitely increase with time is the cost associated
with enhancing and developing new security measures and the collateral cost incurred when
networked and system assets are compromised through underground economy attacks.
6.5 Implications Number Five: Cyber Security has become a Business Process
The plethora of Cyber security problems discussed in the preceding Sections has made Cyber
security a business process in the enterprise. And, the diversity of Cyber security problems,
scope and magnitude of efforts required to cope with emerging threats are undoubtedly the driver
of most new Cyberspace security initiatives and counter measures.
As a result, several practice areas have sprung up as lucrative businesses to service the expanding
Cyber security industry. For example, Computer Forensics Investigations and Incident
Response, Certification and Accreditation, FISMA compliance, Continuous Monitoring, Identity
Management, etc are among the many areas of security practices organized as business units in
the multi-billion dollar Cyber security industry.
Echoes of what this means are abundant and have come from both government leaders and
corporate executives. Many in the industry now regard security as the "Third (3rd) Estate of the
Realm" for the IT industry. Or as Intel CEO Paul Otellini put it (from Talbot, 2005) - in the
wake of the consolidation taking place with security vendors - "We have concluded that security
has become the third pillar of computing." and he questions "Vendors are seeing a big shift in
security, what about enterprises? The answer is that enterprises have also shifted gears and made
significant progress in Cyber security practices since the question was posed - although at a
colossal economic cost. Several federal security mandates such as HIPAA, GBLA, SOX,
FISMA and commercially developed standards have been implemented as part of the process by
almost all institutions and commercial entities.
Consequently, Cyber security has now become an integral part of and can't be separated from
business operations as security teams are organized into business lines around the new enterprise
with new mandates, approaches their roles and dispositions. Echoing the words of Paul Otellini
(from Talbot, 2005) "in the past, a CIO's role was laptop distribution. Today, CIOs build supply
chains. In the past, CISOs distributed anti-virus and set up firewalls. Today, they must know
where data resides, where it moves and how to protect it, which requires a serious,
comprehensive data security practice. This means security teams need to become business
process experts to keep the bad guys disarmed while keeping the good guys productive."
6.6 Implications Number Six: Limitations in Designing and Introducing
Effective Cyber Security Solutions
Securing an enterprise network system is becoming increasingly complex due to several factors
one of which is the changing network and system conditions. Traditionally, network
infrastructures were developed and fostered in a collaborative non-hostile environment and were
built upon assumed trusts which were conducive to sharing with minimum security - if any. But
today, a huge stock of and multitude of software products have been developed with significant
insecure coding across all platforms makes it impossible to develop uniform security systems.
The UNIX (and its variation Linux), Windows and Mac systems applications are developed with
different requirements and address different needs. Also, a host of software applications are
developed for different needs, in different environments and platforms and operate at different
layers of the TCP/IP protocol suite making hardware and software integrating security difficult
especially with no security platform in the current Internet design to address Vulnerabilities.
Consequently, the plethora of networking, software, hardware and other Internet infrastructure
development some of whose requirements run counter to security only signify the difficulties
encountered to develop a common platform security solution. A case in point is intrusion
detection and prevention devices that took more twenty (20) years to be perfected to their current
state and still do not address all security issues they were designed to address.
While there is no short term answer, research and development coupled with proper funding and
effort is needed to solve infrastructures security problems in the long-term. Going by the industry
trend, this will be achieved as an evolutionary path over time, incorporating new security
solutions and methods to achieve proper security base levels needed to protect the data flowing
over the infrastructures. Also, Internet system stakeholders should consider a separate, future
work item to investigate and explore the issues of creating a secure network infrastructure.
6.7 Implications Number Seven: Fusion of Information Technology with
Telecommunication Imposes Extra Burden and Additional Requirements
The fusion of telecommunication with information technology is creating so many opportunities
for the twenty-first century computing. And with it, have come several new products,
technologies and processes both for the wired and wireless world. The latter being a post-
Internet design technology. Increasingly, we have seen billions of wireless devices being
deployed for telephony, corporate business use with Business Process Outsourced services,
teleconferencing and instant messaging and for other purposes by billions of users worldwide.
This has given rise to one area of concern, the inevitable introduction of Cyberspace security
issues by the convergent communications technologies, networks and infrastructure that were not
evident during the original Internet design.
Consequently, what we are dealing with is connection of different components, systems, sub-
systems, processes and technologies with different degrees of security - and in some cases, none
at all. The implication is that if a non-secure infrastructure is connected to a secure infrastructure,
the result is a weakened secure infrastructure, not an increased secure infrastructure for the non-
secure side.
Security is said to be as strong as its weakest link. A case in point is the converged networks
(video, audio, data), where the interconnectivity of networks with security architectural
deficiencies will allow those security-weak networks to affect the converged network (from
Talbot, 2005). The effect is that the converged networks may have serious security problems
from the inception, left over from previous security issues that were not dealt with or solved.
Equally, converged networks with improper security controls will allow improper access to a
wider range of network resources than today's isolated networks. An example is classic analog
voice networks that have unique protocols and connection methods which are typically
expensive and difficult to connect to without specialized equipment, protocols and access. With
Voice over IP (VoIP), however, the ability to use any TCP/IP network with enough speed means
that voice traffic can converge with data traffic over a singular network. It also means that the
previously isolated voice traffic is now on a more available network with its own set of security
problems that can now effect, negatively, the voice traffic used by the vendor, supplier or
customer. With this simple example of convergence, it can be seen that while the resulting
network may save on transport costs for providers, the security implications become rather
serious for the voice side of the deployment where they were previously not as serious a matter
due to the difficulty in connectivity of voice methods in an analog connection methodology.
As a result, many new threats will emerge with new lethal and potent attack vectors.
6.8 Implications Number Eight: Limited and Easy Entry Barriers for
Criminals
Talbot (2005) asserts that there is an unarguably very Low entry barrier for cyber-criminals.
This results from several factors - both technical and non-technical. The barriers could be the
legal and non legal restraints on those aspiring to become Cyber criminals.
First, there is the legal aspect. Many nation states lack the legal instruments to prosecute Cyber
criminals. In fact, some support the cause of Cyber terrorists. Even for the nations that have
implemented the legal framework, prosecution is hardly easy and often so many Cyber attacks
with significant evidence are never prosecuted and if there was ever a prosecution fails in the
courts that have often weighed on the privacy side more in favor of the perpetrators. Also, it is
extremely difficult to collaborate amongst nation states because of nuances related to
jurisdictions.
Second, the technical barrier is very weak as professional hackers, crackers and kiddies are
skilled in the art of breaking into networks bypassing the security controls in place. There are
many reasons for this including the fact that many in the field (developers, security professionals,
etc.) can effectively become the bad guys for financial, revenge or other reasons. Also, the
technologies from which the codes are written are easily available.
According to the Computer Security Institute/FBI report about two-thirds of all attacks are
internally driven and the perpetrators are in most cases the developers, security professionals and
others who have internal and intimate knowledge of the business process.
6.9 Implications Number Nine: Increased Risks of Cyber Attacks and
Warfare on National and Transnational Infrastructures
The infrastructure systems of many nations are now linked to the global Internet network system.
Power generation plants, mass transit systems and other important national and international
infrastructures now sit on the Internet grid. These infrastructures have in effect become complex
networks and associated with critical systems of national and transnational entities.
Both, there is the issue of securing them as they were never built with any planned security
considerations sophisticated enough to effectively counter Bot-net onslaughts even with
implementation of extremely complex security methods that does not go far enough and only
produces base-level security protection for the connected networks, systems and applications.
And with the different stakeholders not able to mount a strong united front for various
marketplace reasons, proper long-term security of connected components will not be achieved
until there is substantial planning and investment for an architectural evolution of the national
infrastructure with security platforms that are able to proactively contain emerging threats of all
types.
Although, implementing Cyber security on some of the systems is an arduous task whose
adequacy could fall far short of what is required to contend the threats from Cyber criminals, in
many cases, proper infrastructure security will not be achieved with the existing network
infrastructure due to original design precepts of all connected entities being trusted. As has been
discussed and demonstrated in the preceding Sections of this Thesis many current Internet
protocols, hardware, software and other associated components do not have any method of
properly being secured against current threats (much less future ones) and provide a great
number of inherent security vulnerabilities that cannot be solved with existing security solutions.
This means that even after application of the Cyber security best practices (BPs), the
infrastructures will remain at risk to Cyber attacks for which BPs cannot stop due to protocol
architecture or other issues that cannot be solved by BPs.
The President's Information Technology Advisory Committee reportl issued in early 2005,
notes: "Today, the threat clearly is growing." "Most indicators and studies of the frequency,
impact, scope, and cost of cyber security incidents -- among both organizations and individuals --
point to continuously increasing levels and varieties of attacks."
Many leading experts contend that Cyber terrorism is at infancy. In 2005, Richard Clarke, White
House Cyber Terror Czar predicts the dawn of "the real act of cyber terror", the "digital Pearl
Harbor" a phenomenon likened to a time bomb slowly building up to explode later. He gave a
classic example of the nation's electrical grid that relies on continuous network-based
communications between power plants and grid managers to maintain a balance between
production and demand that a well-placed attack could trigger a costly blackout that would
cripple part of the country.
The conclusion of the advisory council's report could not have been starker: "The IT
infrastructure is highly vulnerable to premeditated attacks with potentially catastrophic effects."
The Internet system functions as well as it does only because of "the forbearance of the virus
authors themselves," says Jonathan Zittrain (from Talbot, 2005), who cofounded the Berkman
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and holds the Chair in Internet
Governance and Regulation at the University of Oxford. "With one or two additional lines of
code ...the viruses could wipe their hosts' hard drives clean or quietly insinuate false data into
spreadsheets or documents. Take any of the top ten viruses and add a bit of poison to them and
most of the world wakes up on a Tuesday morning unable to surf the Net -- or finding much less
there if it can."
Also, Jonathan Zittrain asserts that the environment and elements that could trigger the "Digital
Pearl Harbor" are building up and recent Cyber security events points to that direction. The
statistical evidence presented in Section 4.2 demonstrates that national and transnational
infrastructures are extremely prone to DoS and DDoS attacks amongst other.
4 President's Information Technology Advisory Committee: "Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization", Report to
the President, February, 2005.
Consequently, due to lack of Internet security architecture and base security capabilities in the
infrastructures or lack of appropriate technologies to solve security problems that exist in the
infrastructures, national and transnational infrastructures are heavily prone to Cyber attacks.
6.10 Implications Number Ten: Existing Internet Infrastructure is an
Impediment to New Technologies
The Internet's basic flaws cost firms billions, impede innovation, and threaten national security.
"It's time for a clean-slate approach" says MIT's David D. Clark (from Talbot, 2005).
The existing Internet archtecture might not fuse well with and therefore stand in the way of
some new technologies for various reasons including the entirely different communication
requirements of some newer technologies such as networks of intelligent sensors used in to
collectively monitor and interpret data/information related to factory and weather conditions,
video images, etc.
Equally, as embedded content computing increasingly become a commonplace, different Internet
security architecture will be required to integrate them. It is also quite conceivable that future
network and internetwork designs will be different from the current and earlier PCs to PCs, PCs
to mainframe networks. All of which will create integration or interoperability problems.
6.11 Summary
Based on the facts and inferences from our discussions and analysis in the preceding Chapters,
we have deduced several implications for Cyber security arising from the current Internet
architecture vulnerabilities.
Primary among them are the implications for a potential Cyber warfare on nations and
transnational infrastructures; constantly emerging threat and attack types that extends the
security domain and perimeter of the enterprise, the emergence of a new underground economy
where Cyber war lords rule over Cyberspace and aided with low entry barriers and with
sophisticated Bot-net technologies are able to wreck havoc on any intended target.
These and the other implications are gradually building up to what may potentially become a
useful arsenal for Cyber warfare for rogue nations.
Finally, we conclude that the primary constraint in achieving effective counter measures against
current and emerging Cyber security threats is the lack of any authentication mechanism on the
Internet system that could serve as the anchor around which an effective Cyber security practice
can be built and mounted.
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have reviewed the background information related to the Internet as a
medium that connects millions of networks and users for the purpose of communicating
and conducting transactions over it; analyzed the current Internet design and the flaws in
the current Internet architecture; described Cyberspace and the security problems that
plagues the system; and conducted a stakeholder analysis of the Internet system.
Additionally, we analyzed several research studies and Cyberspace monitoring reports
and interpreted the statistical data documented on Cyber attacks and using this developed
a grid that maps each Cyber attack type to specific Internet architecture layer.
Based on all the facts and information available, we derived several strategic implications
of the current Internet design for Cyber security.
From the studies, we draw the following conclusions:
1. Based on the analysis, extrapolation of facts and by inferences we assert that the
myriad of Cyber security problems will remain and continue on the current
exponential growth path until the Internet and in particular the TCP/IP stack is
given the ability to authenticate and that only through a collaborative effort by all
stakeholders of the Internet system can the other major Cyber security issues be
resolved especially as it relates to envisioning and fashioning new Cyber security
technologies
2. Although a robust design, the current Internet system has several architectural
flaws primary of which is lack of in-built authentication platform that has given
rise to virtually all kinds of Cyber attack types described in Appendix 1 and
mapped in Figure 21
3. The scope and nature of the Cyber attacks observed today will continue to grow
exponentially unless the Internet is re-designed and coupled with an architecture
that provides several platforms that addresses different areas of security including
authentication
4. The /IP layer serves as a major conduit for several types of Cyber security attacks
and has implications for stakeholder responsibilities that provide the
Interetworking and routing devices that function at this layer
5. The Application layer is the source of newer Cyber attacks and constitutes a
significant growth area for Cyber attacks due to the fact that most of the
applications coupled to this layer were developed without security in mind
6. The emergence of Bot-net technologies has incubated a new type of underground
economy that is a breeding ground for Cyber criminals and has an unmatched
potential to inflict heavy catastrophic damage on the economy and of many
organized business entities, nations and transnational organizations
7. There is a great potential for an increase in the scope and magnitude of massive
and devastating Cyber warfare on critical national and transnational
infrastructures unless the Internet system vulnerabilities are mitigated
Finally, we conclude that the robust Internet architecture presents abundant opportunities
for users, firms, governments and others to engage in creative endeavors and such
endeavors can only thrive with an effective Internet security that includes the ability to
authenticate users on the Internet without which the full extent of the potentials will not
be realized.
7.2 Recommendations
In recognition of the fact that Cyber security is a moving target that will require
continual refinement, additions and improvement; and that there will continue to exist
security conditions that will require development of technologies and techniques that are
not currently practical or available to solve the security issues they create, we make the
following the recommendations.
1. Stakeholder Shared Responsibilities
Internet system stakeholders all share the responsibility to collaboratively provide
and promote a secure Cyberspace environment based on a new architecture that
mandates basic security enforcement mechanisms across the board.
2. Collaboration on Infrastructure and Services
Security vendors and Internet infrastructure providers should collaboratively
develop a plug and play platform with security layers and buffer to address the
needs of new and emerging technologies and applications.
3. We fully subscribe to David Clark's recommendations on creating a new
Internet Architecture that:
a. Gives the medium basic security architecture -- the ability to authenticate.
b. Makes the new architecture practical by devising protocols that allow
Internet service providers to better route traffic and collaborate to offer
advanced services without compromising their businesses.
c. Allows future computing devices of any size to connect to the Internet --
not just PCs but sensors and embedded processors.
d. Adds technology that makes the network easier to manage and more
resilient. For example, a new design that allows all pieces of the network
to detect and report emerging problems -- whether technical breakdowns,
traffic jams, or replicating worms -- to network administrators."
4. Giving the TCP/IP Protocol the Ability to Authenticate
The TCP/IP protocol suite lacks authentication the ability to authenticate and is
therefore not suitable for connection to ubiquitous, global and un-trusted networks.
This weakness results into malicious attacks. While current practices exist to mitigate
the vulnerabilities through network layer controls, ACL's and filters, these measures
are complicated, hard to manage and can often not be fully implemented because of
performance impacts, therefore some vulnerabilities still exist.
Consequently, longer-term industry work is needed to define new or extended
protocols with authentication; improved secure network element technology; define
business process and criteria for establishing trust relationships; and establish
interoperable implementation plans for rolling-out changes, that by definition cannot
be backward compatible.
5. Addressing the Technical Protocol Issues
The Internet Engineering Task Force organizations (IETF) as an open, multi-vendor
forum that includes participants from both the public and private sectors should
provide the forum for definition the protocols, and address technical protocol issues,
practical operational, deployment, and infrastructure issues to ensure:
1) That the protocols can be deployed in a manner that doesn't introduce more
vulnerability into the Internet and in a manner that is practical to support
operationally.
2) Vendor products support new, standards-based protocols in operationally
supportable configurations.
3) For updated protocols that require use of certificate-based authentication or
similar mechanisms, that
e there are industry agreements on what the requirements for the identity
certificates are,
* suitable entities are identified as the certification authority
" scalable key distribution mechanisms exist.
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Appendix 1: Several well-known TCP/IP vulnerabilities and Cyber Attacks [18]
Table 13: TCP/IP Attacks.
The Three-way Handshake (TCP "SYN") Sequence Guessing and Source Desynchronized State (Man-in-the-middle-
Routing attack)
SYN attacks result from a very serious flaw that leads to In computer networking, the term IP Sometimes called "Man -in-the-middle-attack" this
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The current architecture address spoofing or IP spoofing refers to interesting variant on IP spoofmg allows a host to
of the TCP/IP assures a delivery system that experience the creation of Internet Protocol (IP) insert itself in the middle of a connection between two
in an Internet environment, a high message latency and packets with a forged source IP address, hosts -- connection hijacking [Joncheray95]. This type
loss, resulting in messages that arrive late or in non called spoofing, with the purpose of of attack is sophisticated in that the attacker is able to
sequential order. The TCP half of TCP/IP uses sequence concealing the identity of the sender or bypass security mechanisms in place. For example, IP
numbers so that it can ensure data is given to the user in impersonating another computing system." spoofing alone may not bypass additional security,
the correct order, regardless of when the data is actually (Wikipedia) such as authentication by the Unix password
received. These sequence numbers are initially mechanism, Kerberos, or one-time password systems
established during the opening phase of a TCP IP Spoofig is an attack where an attacker like SKEY [RFC1760]. But with this attack, an
connection, in the three-way handshake. pretends to be sending data from an jP attacker can allow normal authentication to proceed
address other than its own [Morris85, between the two hosts, and then seize control of the
SYN attacks (also known as SYN Flooding) take Bellovin89]. The IP layer assumes that the connection.
advantage of a flaw in how most hosts (sending and source address on any IP packet it receives
receiving computer) implement this three-way is the same IP address as the system that Connection hijacking exploits a "desynchronized state"
handshake. The three-way handshake in Transmission actually sent the packet -- it does no in TCP communication. When the sequence number in
Control Protocol (also called the three message authentication. a received packet is not the same as the expected
handshake) is the method used to establish and tear sequence number, the connection is said to be
down network connections. This handshaking technique There are variants of IP spoofing: "desynchronized." Depending on the actual value of the
is referred to as the 3-way handshake or as "SYN-SYN- received sequence number, the TCP layer may either
ACK" (or more accurately SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK). The discard or buffer the packet. There is a choice, because
TCP handshaking mechanism is designed so that two TCP uses a sliding window protocol to allow efficient
computers attempting to communicate can negotiate the communication even in the presence of packet loss and
parameters of the network connection before beginning high network latency. So, if the received packet is not
communication. This process is also designed so that the one expected, but is within the current window, the
both ends can initiate and negotiate separate connections packet will be saved on the premise that it will be
at the same time. expected later (various TCP mechanisms ensure that
An illustration of this phenomenon is given in Figure 13.
When Host B receives the SYN request from A, it must
keep track of the partially opened connection in a "listen
queue" for at least 75 seconds. This is to allow
successful connections even with long network delays.
The problem with doing this is that many
implementations can only keep track of a very limited
number of connections (most track only 5 connections
by default, though some like SGI's IRIX track up to
1024 [Luckenbach96]). A malicious host can exploit the
small size of the listen queue by sending multiple SYN
requests to a host, but never replying to the SYN&ACK
the other host sends back. By doing so, the other host's
listen queue is quickly filled up, and it will stop
accepting new connections, until a partially opened
connection in the queue is completed or times out. This
ability to effectively remove a host from the network for
at least 75 seconds can be used solely as a denial-of-
service attack, or it can be used as a tool to implement
other attacks, like IP Spoofing.
Sequence Guessing:
The sequence number used in TCP
connections is a 32 bit number, so it would
seem that the odds of guessing the correct
ISN are exceedingly low. However, if the
ISN for a connection is assigned in a
predictable way, it becomes relatively easy
to guess. This flaw in TCP/IP
implementations was recognized as far
back as 1985, when Robert Morris
described how to exploit predictable ISN's
in BSD 4.2, a Unix derivative [Morris85].
In BSD 4.2, the ISN for a connection is
assigned from a global counter. This
counter is incremented by 128 each
second, and by 64 after each new
connection (i.e., whenever an ISN is
assigned). By first establishing a real
the expected packet will eventually arrive). If the
received packet is outside of the current window, it will
be discarded.
Thus, when two hosts are desynchronized enough, they
will discard (ignore) packets from each other. An
attacker can then inject forged packets with the correct
sequence numbers (and potentially modify or add
commands to the communication). Obviously, this
requires the attacker to be located on the
communication path between the two hosts so that he
may eavesdrop, in order to replicate packets being sent.
The key to this attack is creating the desynchronized
state. Joncheray describes two possible ways to do this:
one is during the three-way handshake, and the other is
in the middle of an established connection.
Desynchronization during connection establishment:
In this form of desynchronization, the attacker resets a
connection during the three-way handshake. After host
B sends the SYN&ACK packet to host A, the attacker
forges new packets from B (to A) in which the
connection is first closed via the RST bit, and then a
new three-way handshake is initiated with A --
identical to the original, "real" handshake but with
different sequence numbers. Host B now ignores
messages from A (because A is using the attacker's
new sequence numbers), and Host A ignores messages
from B (because A is expecting messages with the
attacker's sequence numbers).
The attacker then replicates new packets, with the
correct sequence numbers, whenever A and B try to
communicate. In doing so, the attacker may also
connection to the victim, the attacker can
determine the current state of the system's
counter. The attacker then knows that the
next ISN to be assigned by the victim is
quite likely to be the predetermined ISN,
plus 64. The attacker has an even higher
chance of correctly guessing the ISN if he
sends a number of spoofed IP frames, each
with a different, but likely, ISN.
However, when the host receiving spoofed
packets completes its part of the three-way
handshake, it will send a SYN&ACK to
the spoofed host. This host will reject the
SYN&ACK, because it never started a
connection -- the host indicates this by
sending a reset command (RST), and the
attacker's connection will be aborted. To
avoid this, the attacker can use the
aforementioned SYN attack to swamp the
host it is imitating. The SYN&ACK sent
by the attacked host will then be ignored,
along with any other packets sent while the
host is flooded. The attacker then has free
reign to finish with his attack. Of course, if
the impersonated host happens to be off-
line (or was somehow forced off-line), the
attacker need not worry about what the
victim is sending out.
Incrementing the ISN counter more often,
as other operating systems may do, does
not appear to help. Even if the counter is
incremented 250,000 times a second (as
suggested by the TCP standard), an
attacker may still be able to approximately
predict the ISN. By repeatedly guessing, it
modify the messages or inject his own.
is likely that the attacker will establish a
connection with the correct ISN within a
few hours
Source Routing:
Another variant of IP spocfmg makes use
of a rarely used IP option, "Source
Routing" [Bellovin89]. Source routing
allows the originating host to specify the
path (route) that the receiver should use to
reply to it. An attacker may take advantage
of this by specifying a route that by-passes
the real host, and instead directs replies to
a path it can monitor (e.g., to itself or a
local subnet). Although simple, this attack
may not be as successful now, as routers
are commonly configured to drop packets
with source routing enabled.
Desynchronization in the middle of a connection:
The previous attack is limited to the initial connection.
If a RST packet is sent in the middle of a connection,
the connection is closed -- and the application/user is
notified of this. To cause desynchronization in the
middle of a connection, without closing the connection,
only the sequence number counters should be altered.
The Telnet protocol, in particular, provides an
interesting mechanism to do this. Telnet allows special
"NOP" commands to be sent. These commands do
nothing, but the act of sending the bytes in the NOP
command increments the expected sequence number
counter on the receiver. By sending enough of these
NOP commands, an attacker can cause the connection
to become desynchronized. The attacker can then begin
replicating new packets, with the correct sequence
numbers, as before.
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Figure 32: SYN Flooding [18].
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Appendix 2: Cyber attack Types.
Table 14: Types of Cyber Attacks [27].
Types of Cyber
Attacks Description
Denial of service A method of attack from a single source that denies system access to legitimate users by overwhelming
the target computer with messages and blocking legitimate traffic. It can prevent a system from being able
to exchange data with other systems or use the Internet.
Distributed denial A variant of the denial-of-service attack that uses a coordinated attack from a distributed system of
of service computers rather than from a single source. It often makes use of worms to spread to multiple computers
that can then attack the target.
Exploit tools Publicly available and sophisticated tools that intruders of various skill levels can use to determine
vulnerabilities and gain entry into targeted systems.
Logic bombs A form of sabotage in which a programmer inserts code that causes the program to perform a destructive
action when some triggering event occurs, such as terminating the programmer's employment.
Phishing The creation and use of e-mails and Web sites-designed to look like those of well-known legitimate
businesses, financial institutions, and government agencies-in order to deceive Internet users into
disclosing their personal data, such as bank and financial account information and passwords. The
phishers tben use that information for criminal purposes, such as identity theft and fraud.
Sniffer Synonymous with packet sniffer. A program that intercepts routed data and examines each packet in
search of specified information, such as passwords transmitted in clear text.
Trojan horse computer program that conceals harmful code. A Trojan horse usually masquerades as a useful program
at a user would wish to execute.
Virus A program that infects computer files, usually executable programs, by inserting a copy of itself into the
file. These copies are usually executed when the infected file is loaded into memory, allowing the virus to
infect other files. Unlike a computer worm, a virus requires human involvement (usually unwitting) to
propagate.
Vishing A method of phishing based on voice-over-Internet Protocol technology and open-source call center
software that have made it inexpensive for scammers to set up phony call centers and criminals to send e-
mail or text messages to potential victims, saying there has been a security problem and they need to call
their bank to reactivate a credit or debit card, or send text messages to cell phones, instructing potential
victims to contact fake online banks to renew their accounts.
War driving A method of gaining entry into wireless computer networks using a laptop, antennas, and a wireless
network adaptor that involves patrolling locations to gain unauthorized access.
Worm An independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself from one system to another across a
network. Unlike computer viruses, worms do not require human involvement to propagate.
Zero-day exploit A cyber threat taking advantage of security vulnerability on the same day that the vulnerability becomes
known to the general public and for which there are no available fixes.
